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INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS A CONTRACT?

Anyone who proposes to redefine a fundamental legal concept like
"contract" must first answer Ian Ayers' challenge: "Who cares"?' Redefinitions

Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law.
1. Ian Ayers, Empire or Residue: Competing Visions of the Contractual Canon, 26 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 897, 898 (1999) ("Our first response to someone's impassioned suggestion that a
particular area is or is not contractual should be 'Who cares?' or perhaps more precisely 'Why
should we care?"'). See ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, 1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.3 (Joseph M.

99
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of established legal terms require costly investments in time and effort and so
must earn their keep, either by facilitating practical legal analysis or by
improving legal theory. This Article seeks to demonstrate that the dominant
conception of contract has become inadequate for both practical and theoretical
2
purposes.
A more comprehensive conception of contract, however, would
easily cure this inadequacy. 3
What a contract is understood to be can have direct effects on the everyday
application of law. In judicial practice, an authoritative definition of contract can
be critical to the application of a legal rule in which "contract" is a material
term. 4 Thus, whether promissory estoppel or fraud is or is not classified as
contractual may determine the applicability of a defense such as governmental
immunity5 or infancy. 6 The utility of a definition of the term in such a case turns
on policy considerations unique to the rule in which it appears. A more
comprehensive definition of contract invites the court to consider applying the
rule to other transactions that may implicate the same policies and principles.
Reframing concepts such as "contract" can also be useful for explanatory or
normative legal theory and legal pedagogy.8 Contracts scholars periodically
propose redefinitions of "contract" in order to illuminate or emphasize its
particular legal features, 9 even as they question whether any general definition of

Perillo ed., rev'd ed. 1993) (arguing that the use of the term "contract" should be such as to serve
"our necessity and convenience"); PATRICK S. ATIYAH, ESSAYS ON CONTRACT 1 (1986).
2.
See CORBIN, supra note 1.
3.
Id.; Arthur Alan Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 132, 134 (1970)
(arguing that the classification of legal relations as "contracts" is done to "promote intellectual and
operational efficiency"); Ian R. Macneil, Whither Contracts?, 21 J. LEGAL EDUC. 403, 412-13
(1969) (defending the claim that there is a general category of "contract" for pedagogical purposes
and identifying its elements).
4.
See CORBIN, supra note 1, at 7 n.3.
5.
Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Summit Cty. v. DeLozier, 917 P.2d 714, 717 (Colo. 1996)
(deeming promissory estoppel claim as contractual for purposes of applying the rule of
governmental immunity to tort claims).
6.
Ex parte Pritchett, 65 So. 521, 522 (Ala. 1914) (stating infancy was a defense to breach
of contract but not a defense to an action to rescind a contract for fraud).
7.
See CORBIN, supra note 1.
8.
See CORBIN, supra note 1; Karl Llewellyn, What Price Contract? An Essay in
Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 704-08 (1931).
9
Legal scholars through the years have suited their concepts of contract to their theoretical
and pedagogical needs, often rejecting an essentialist, all-purpose definition. See CORBIN, supra
note 1; Macneil, supra note 3, at 404-07 (identifying the elements common to all contracts as
cooperative behavior, economic exchange, planning for the future, potential external sanctions,
social control, and sometimes an alienable property interest); Ayers, supra note 1, at 899 (adopting
a broad, "imperial" definition of contract in order to examine private agreements' ability to change
default rules of many kinds); Jay M. Feinman, The Last Promissory Estoppel Article, 61 FORDHAM
L. REV. 303, 311-12 (1992) (arguing that relational theory should replace neoclassical theories that
focus on promises as bases for obligation); Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion Some
Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 633 (1943) ("[T]he use of the word
'contract' does not commit us to an indiscriminate extension of the ordinary contract rules to all
contracts."). See generally Llewellyn, supra note 8 (listing differing conceptions of contract and
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contract is either possible or useful for all purposes.' 0 But to date, all proposed
definitions have agreed that one of contract's essential features is a legally
enforceable duty." It is no exaggeration to say that contract theory has been
obsessed with the creation of duties, as it ponders why and how the law enforces
certain promises and not others.12
The classical conception of contract holds it to be a legally enforceable
obligation created by the agreement of the obligor and obligee. 13 The obligation
is usually formed by the parties' mutual assent to a bargain, an exchange of the
obligor's promise in return for a consideration given by the obligee. 14 The
source and scope of this obligation distinguish contract law from tort law and the
law of property ownership, under each of which obligations arise by operation of
law and bind an indeterminate number of obligors. 15 The most salient,
categorical feature of classical contracts has thus been that they are all particular
forms of obligation created in a particular way.
Modem legal theory has dispensed with almost all of the traditional
trappings of the classical contract.16 Both courts and scholars recognize that
contracts may arise in the absence of promise, agreement,1 bargain,19 or

reflecting on the difficulty of defining a general theory of contract and the costs of systemization).
Scholars have occasionally intimated that contract might include non-promissory agreements. See
id. at 779 (arguing that the field of contract includes such non-promissory agreements as we choose
to put in it).
10. See CORBIN, supra note 1; ATIYAH, supra note 1, at 18 ("There is no such thing as a
typical contract at all."); Ayers, supra note 1 ("We should be quite skeptical of any canon
definitions that are divorced from consequentialist considerations.").
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); CORBIN, supra
note 1; IAN MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL
RELATIONS 5 (1980).

12. "The first great question of contract law . . is what kinds of promises should be
enforced." See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Principlesof Consideration,67 CORNELL L. REV. 640,
640 (1982). The question was made necessary by the historical development of the remedy of
assumpsit, which demanded some principled way by which to identify enforceable promises.
Historians agree that when promises became enforceable as such under the writ of general
assumpsit, the rules of consideration became necessary to prevent the writ from making all promises
enforceable.

See generally PATRICK ATYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT

139-54 (1979) (outlining the development of consideration as the criterion for the enforceability of
promises); A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 199-326 (1975)

(detailing the transition from writ of assumpsit jurisprudence to an understanding of enforceable
promises as grounded in consideration).
13. See generally ATIYAH, supra note 1, at 10-56 (criticizing the classical conception of
contracts as enforceable obligations created by agreement).
14.

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF CONTRACTS

§

17(1) (AM. LAW INST.

1981) ("[T]he

formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the
exchange and a consideration."). "Bargain" is defined as "an agreement to exchange promises or to
exchange a promise for a performance or to exchange performances." Id. § 3.
15. See ATIYAH, supra note 1, at 11-16 (describing the classical view of contract and tort).
16. See generally SIMPSON, supra note 12 (explaining the evolution of contract law from its
medieval roots to the modem day).
17. For example, an actual promise is unnecessary if a promise is implied from the
circumstances. See CORBIN, supra note 1; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
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20

consideration.
Indeed, the sole surviving sine qua non of the classical
conception of contract is that a new, legally enforceable obligation is created by
21
some sort of deliberate interaction between the obligor and the obligee.
This Article concerns legal relationships that are not "contracts" in even this
22
minimal sense.
Like classical contracts, they are deliberately created by
agreement of the parties to the relationship and are binding (legally effective)
23
Unlike classical contracts, they do not obligate either
only on those parties.
party to act, they do not create rights, and they do not rest on actual or implied
24
promises.
These anomalous legal relationships are formally known as
25
They share no collective name and have
privileges, powers, and immunities.
never been recognized to constitute a legal genre for analytical or pedagogical
26
purposes.
Yet they are essential constituents of every legal relationship and
their design and implementation is a central concern of commercial legal
27
practice. The salient, categorical feature of these legal relationships is that they
all arise from agreements made by the parties that they affect.28

Privileges, powers, and immunities arise both as ancillary terms in rights29
creating contracts and as discrete agreements.
Common examples of discrete
agreements creating these non-rights relationships include releases, licenses,
waivers, disclaimers, options, dispute resolution agreements, assignments, and
non-reliance agreements.30 Privileges, powers, and immunities, no less than

INST. 1981). Quasi-contracts or contracts implied in law are enforceable in the absence of a promise.

See, e.g., Ex'r of Estate of Sceva v. True, 53 N.H. 627, 630, 632 (1873). Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, even a buyer's description of goods to be sold may create express warranties in
the absence of a seller's promise if that description becomes part of the basis of the parties' bargain.
U.C.C. § 2-313.3(1)(b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1977).
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981) ("[T]here are
contracts which do not require agreement" (citation omitted)).
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 4, topic 2, intro. note (AM. LAW INST.
1981) ("The rules of this Topic are exceptions to the general requirement of a bargain .... .").
20. CORBIN, supra note 1, § 8.1 (demonstrating Corbin's criticism of the idea that bargainedfor consideration was necessary for a contract); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 82-94
(AM. LAW INST. 1981) (describing "Contracts Without Consideration").
21. Arthur L. Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations, 26
YALE L.J. 169, 171 (1917).
22. Id.
23. Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 24-25 (1913) [hereinafter Hohfeld, FundamentalConceptionsl].
24. Id. at 28-29.
25. See infra Part II.A.
26. Hohfeld, FundamentalConcepts I, supra note 23, at 30.
27. See Arthur L. Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology, 29 YALE L.J. 163, 163 (1919).
28. Id. at 164.
29. Hohfeld, FundamentalConcepts I, supra note 23, at 30.
30. See generally S. A. Empresa De Viacao Area Rio Grandense v. Boeing Co., 641 F.2d
746, 750 (9th Cir. 1981) (discussing waivers and how it was sufficient to disclaim liability);
Vassilkovska v. Woodfield Nissan, Inc., 830 N.E.2d 619, 624 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (discussing
arbitration agreements); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87 (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(defining options); id. § 284 (defining releases); CORBIN, supra note 1 (discussing assignments);
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rights, are essential to the design and function of the legal relationships that
31
facilitate complex economic transactions.
Because their judicial recognition invokes the core principles and policies
that justify enforcement of rights contracts, this Article will argue that they
should be recognized and treated as contracts by both courts and scholars.
Since courts rarely acknowledge the ways in which privileges, powers, and
immunities differ from rights contracts, they have vacillated over whether to
32
apply ordinary rules of contract law to their formation and enforcement.
Courts have been particularly inconsistent in their application of the
consideration doctrine to non-rights agreements.33 This Article seeks, in part, to
rationalize the role of consideration in the formation of privileges, powers, and
immunities.34
A comprehensive conception of contract thus embraces any aggregate of
rights, powers, privileges, or immunities that the parties to such relationships
may create by agreement or by other manifestations of intent.35 As a subset of
this broader conception, conventional contracts would become known as "rights
contracts," consisting primarily of duties of contract performance and their
corresponding rights of enforcement. Privilege contracts, power contracts, and
immunity contracts bind the parties in different ways, which will be described

THEODORE M. HAGELIN, TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION LAW AND PRACTICE CASES AND MATERIALS

6 (2011) (discussing the definitions of licenses); Kevin Davis, Licensing Lies: Merger Clauses, the
ParolEvidence Rule andPre-ContractualMisrepresentations,33 VAL. U. L. REV. 485, 485 (1999)
(discussing disclaimers).
31. Macneil, supra note 3, at 404-05.
32.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 284

cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (stating

that "the rules of interpretation that apply to contracts generally apply also to writings that purport
to be releases"). See generally AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1761 (2011)
(citing Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 447 (2006)) (stating that
arbitration clauses are treated like contracts); Smith v. Cornell Univ., 45 N.Y.S. 640, 643 (Sup. Ct.
1894) (stating that rights and privileges are synonymous terms); Hugh Evander Willis, Contracts:A
Law ofRights, Powers, Privileges, and Immunities, 27 IND. L.J. 182, 182-83 (1952) (discussing the
social control over parties' freedom to determine their "rights, powers, privileges and immunities"
in a contract).
33. See, e.g., Vassilkovska v. Woodfield Nissan, Inc., 830 N.E.2d 619, 624 (Ill. Ct. App.
2005) (stating that consideration is necessary for arbitration); Brown v. Ky. Lottery Corp., 891
S.W.2d 90, 92 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995) (citing Cuppy v. Gen. Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp.,
378 S.W.2d 629, 632 (1964)) (stating that releases need consideration).
34. See generally Willis supra note 32, at 188-89 (outlining various types of consideration).
35. See Hohfeld, Fundamental Conceptions I, supra note 23, at 21, 24; Wesley N. Hohfeld,
FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 746 (1917)
[hereinafter Hohfeld, FundamentalConceptions II].
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36

below. Together, the four types of contract serve complementary purposes and
represent the full extent of the legal capacity for voluntary private ordering.37
A comprehensive conception of contract offers several theoretical and
practical advantages to both jurists and scholars.38 For analytic purposes, a
comprehensive conception of contract annexes a mass of legal relationships that
currently occupy an unclaimed territory bounded by contract, tort, and property.
As the law of voluntary private ordering, contract should rightfully claim
jurisdiction over these relationships because they are all deliberately-formed,
consensual legal structures, with the same utility and the same theoretical
justifications as rights contracts. Contract law rather than tort law or property
law provides the principles that should govern their formation and legal effect.
A comprehensive conception would align the concept of contract with much
actual judicial usage, which already conflicts with the official definitions by
affixing the "contract" label to many relations that do not create obligations,
such as releases, options, and disclaimers. 39 Almost unreflectively, courts
already recognize these agreements as contracts simply because they are
personal legal relationships created by agreement.40
A comprehensive conception of contract would have the potential to
rationalize and harmonize the rules and principles that govern creation and
recognition of all private legal relationships. 4 1 By focusing on the central feature
of deliberate formation by agreement, a comprehensive conception de-centers
the controversial doctrine of consideration, which has been identified with
42
traditional contract.
Instead, it focuses on the parties' mutual agreement as
evidence that judicial recognition of the new relationship will be warranted. By
focusing on what these agreements have in common with each other and with
rights contracts, a comprehensive concept of contract enables a functional and
economic analysis of their rules of formation and enforcement and justificatory
principles.43 For pedagogical purposes, the study of comprehensive contracts

&

36. See, e.g., Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 447, 449 (2006)
(discussing power contracts); Cloud Corp. v. Hasbro, Inc., 314 F.3d 289, 294 (7th Cir. 2002)
(discussing immunity contracts); Christopher N. Newman, A License Is Not a "ContractNot to
Sue": DisentanglingProperty and Contract in the Law of Copyright Licenses, 98 IOWA L. REV.
1101, 1115 (2013) (discussing privilege contracts).
37. See Hohfeld, FundamentalConceptions I, supra note 23, at 58-59.
38. See Leff, supra note 6, at 134; Macneil, supra note 3, at 412-13.
39. See, e.g., Sears, Sucsy & Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 392 F. Supp. 398, 405 (N.D. Ill.
1974) (stating that a release is a contract); Lomas & Nettleton Co. v. Tiger Enters., Inc., 585 P.2d
949, 952 (Idaho 1978) (citing Little Rock Packing Co. v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 262 F.2d 327,
329 (8th Cir. 1959)) (stating that "a release is a type of contract"); Danann Reality Corp. v. Harris,
157 N.E.2d 597, 599 (N.Y. 1959) (generally discussing disclaimers); 15 SAMUEL WILLISTON
WALTER H. E. JAEGER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1820 (3d ed. 1972).
40. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 15.
41. See Willis, supra note 32, at 188, 191.
42. See Corbin, supra note 21, at 171-72 (stating that barters and gifts are contractual even
without consideration).
43. See infra Part V.A-B.
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becomes the study of the law of private ordering by agreement rather than the
study of a particular form of civil obligation.
Part II of this Article shows that, contrary to the traditional conception of
contract-as-obligation, all contracts are bundles containing a combination of the
four fundamental legal relationships: rights, privileges, powers, and
immunities.44 These bundles need not include rights and obligations as their
primary elements but may consist entirely or mainly of privileges, powers, or
immunities.45
Part III describes the language and forms of agreement that create
46
contractual privileges, powers, and immunities.
Because privileges, powers,
and immunities do not commit either party to act, the predominant mode of
creating privileges, powers, and immunities is by means of declarative speech
acts rather than by promises.47 As a matter of form, because creation of
privileges, powers, and immunities does not create burdensome duties, they do
not require consideration or one of its substitutes except when one party's
interests are enhanced at the expense of the other, and not always then. 48
Part IV describes four instances of scholarly and judicial confusion of
contractual privileges, powers, and immunities with contractual rights: Releases;
non-reliance agreements; options; and mandatory arbitration agreements.49
Courts and commentators go astray in each instance by treating these agreements
as if they were rights contracts, requiring consideration for their validity and
50
treating them as if they were promises that could be breached.
In each case,
courts ignore the distinctive features of privileges, powers, and immunities by
subjecting them to rules appropriate only for rights contracts.
Part V proposes to reconceptualize contract to include any personal right,
privilege, power, or immunity deliberately formed by agreement of the parties to
52
the relationship.
It also seeks to rationalize the roles of consideration and

44. See infra Part II.B.
45. See Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudencefrom
Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 975, 986-87 (1982) (citing Hohfeld, Fundamental
Conceptions I, supra note 23, at 30, 32, 33).
46. See infra Part III.
47. See JOHN R. SEARLE, EXPRESSION AND MEANING: STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF SPEECH
ACTS 1-8 (1979) (discussing speech acts generally and describing the specific types).
48. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 87, 273 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); id. at
ch. 12, topic 1, intro. note. See generally Brown v. Ky. Lottery Corp., 891 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1995) (showing that a release needs consideration even though it is a privilege contract).
49. See infra Part IV.
50. Vassilkovska v. Woodfield Nissan, Inc., 830 N.E.2d 619, 624 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (stating
that consideration is necessary for arbitration); Brown, 891 S.W.2d at 92 (citing Cuppy v. Gen.
Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 378 S.W.2d 629, 632 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964)) (stating that
releases need consideration). See ABRY Partners V.L.P. v. F&W Acquisition, 891 A.2d 1032,
1035 (Del. Ch. 2006).
51. See, e.g., Bell BCI Co. v. United States, 570 F.3d 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (showing
how a release was interpreted as a contract term); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 284
cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
52. See infra Part V; MACNEIL, supra note 11, at 4.
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consent in the formation of non-rights contracts. 3 Finally, it addresses the
theoretical justifications for giving legal effect to agreements that create
-54
privileges, powers, and immunities.
II.

THE (INCOMPLETE) CONVENTIONAL CONCEPTION OF CONTRACT

Formal definitions of "contract" appear in the two most frequently-cited
sources of American contract law, the Restatement of Contracts and the Uniform
Commercial Code.
A contract is a promise or set of promises for the breach of
which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the
law in some way recognizes as a duty.56
'Contract' means the total legal obligation that results from the
57
parties' agreement....
A comparison of these provisions can be instructive. Each definition is
stipulative and conclusory. Neither states the conditions that are necessary or
sufficient for the existence of a contract.5 The Restatement definition refers to a
promise, which is a performative speech act5 9 that may create the legal relation.
60
The U.C.C. definition refers directly to the legal relation itself, the obligation.
The U.C.C. definition reaches non-promissory obligations, such as implied

53.
54.
55.

See infra Part V.
Id.
U.C.C. § 1-201(11) (AM. LAW INST. & UNITF. LAW COMM'N 1977); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
57. U.C.C. § 1-201(11) (AM. LAW INST. & UNITF. LAW COMM'N 1977) ("'Contract,' as
distinguished from 'agreement,' means the total legal obligation that results from the parties'
agreement as determined by the Uniform Commercial Code as supplemented by any other
applicable laws."); id. § 1-201(b)(3) ("Agreement," in turn, is defined as "the bargain of the parties
in fact, as found in their language or inferred from other circumstances, including course of
performance, course of dealings or usage of trade .... ).
58. CORBIN, supra note 1 (arguing that the stated definition of a contract does not include the
necessary operative facts).
59. See Jonathan Yovel, What Is Contract Law "About": Speech Act Theory and a Critique
of Skeletal Promises, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 937, 940 (2000) ("Performative language is the premier
and paradigmatic agent of action in law.").
60. U.C.C. § 1-201(11) (1977). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 cmt. b
(AM. LAW INST. 1979); CORBIN, supra note 1 (pointing out that the term "contract" is used
variously to refer to the operative act, the legal relation created by the operative act, and the written
memorandum of the operative act). This Article will use "obligation" and "duty" interchangeably.
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62

warranties and the statutory obligation of good faith, which the Restatement
definition arguably misses.63
More important than these differences, however, is that the Restatement and
the Uniform Commercial Code agree in defining contract as a relationship
created by two parties, at least one of whom owes a legally enforceable
obligation to the other.64 This centuries-old, common law usage is uniformly
65

observed by contemporary authorities,
with only an occasional
acknowledgment that a contract may consist of more than promises or
66
obligations or indeed might be something altogether different.
The received definition is taught in law school, often on the first day of
Contracts class. A law student having been informed that a contract is a legally
enforceable, promissory obligation might then be given a quiz in which she is
asked which of the following agreements creates a contract under that definition,
assuming each agreement to have its intended effect:
1.
2.

A and B agree that A's contract offer to B will be irrevocable
for a fixed time.67
A and B agree during contract negotiations that no liability will
arise from any merely oral promise or factual representation
68
made by either of them in the negotiation.

61. See U.C.C. §§ 2-312, 2-312 cmt. 1, 2-314, 2-315 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N
1977) (positing that implied warranties arise automatically, without any "particular language or
action").
62. U.C.C. § 1-304 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1977).
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (acknowledging
implied obligations, including the obligation of good faith, that are not expressed in contractual
promises).
64. Compare U.C.C. § 1-201 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1977), with
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
65. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (AM. LAW INST. 1979)
(acknowledging implied obligations, including the obligation of good faith, which are not expressed
in contractual promises); CORBIN, supra note 1 ("[T]he legal relations resulting from certain
operative acts, always including the relation of right in one party and duty in the other.") (emphasis
added); JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 1:1
(6th ed. 2009) ("Every contract involves at least one promise that has legal consequences."); E.
ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 1.1 (3d ed. 1999) (using the Restatement definition); 1
SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1:1 (4th ed.
1993) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1979)) (observing that
the heart of a contract is in its promissory nature); SIR PERCY H. WINFIELD, POLLOCK ON
CONTRACTS 1-2 (11th ed. 1942) (defining contracts as "a promise or set of promises which the law
will enforce").
66. See MACNEIL, supra note 11, at 4 ("By contract I mean no less and no more than the
relations among the parties to the process of projecting exchange into the future."). But see Corbin,
supra note 1 (containing the most notable exception).
67. See U.C.C. § 2-205 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1977); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87 (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (stating that an irrevocable offer is known as
an "option contract").
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A and B agree that all disputes relating to their transaction will
be governed by the law of Idaho and that venue for any
69
enforcement action will lie solely in the courts of Oregon.
A agrees that B is free to acquire and market A's personal
information obtained as a result of A's use of B's internet
-70
service.
A and B agree that A will forfeit a deposit with B if A fails to
perform a specific action before the agreed date.
A assigns to B its rights to payment under a contract with C.72
A and B rescind their employment contract and agree that
neither will have any further obligations under it.7 3
A releases a personal injury tort claim against B in return for a
payment by B.
A and B agree that their written contract may not be modified
except in a writing signed by both of them.

68. This is commonly known as a "no-reliance clause." See Extra Equipamentos e
Exportacao, Ltda. v. Case Corp., 541 F.3d 719, 724 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that no-reliance clauses
serve the legitimate function of blocking efforts to vary a written contract); Kronenberg v. Katz, 872
A.2d 568, 593 (Del. Ch. 2004) (discussing misrepresentations); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Tack-Tico
Acquisition Co., 454 S.E.2d 789 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (discussing promises); Terracom Dev. Grp.,
Inc. v. Coleman Cable & Wire Co., 365 N.E.2d 1028 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (regarding a situation
where the parties agreed that neither would be bound until a definitive written agreement had been
executed); Davis, supra note 30 (asserting that disclaimers of liability for pre-contractual
misrepresentations are common in commercial contracts). See also Allen Blair, A Matter of Trust:
Should No-Reliance Clauses Bar Claims for Fraudulent Inducement of Contracts?, 92 MARQ. L.
REV. 423 (2009) (showing that jurisdictions differ on whether such clauses will bar claims of
fraudulent inducement).
69. See U.C.C. § 1-301(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1977) (providing that
parties may choose applicable law by agreement); Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585
(1981) (enforcing a forum selection clause).
70. See NANCY S. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS (2013).
71. Notice that the threat of forfeiture does not succeed by placing A under a duty, but
instead creates an incentive to perform that does not require judicial enforcement.
72. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1979) ("An
assignment of a right is a manifestation of the assignor's intention to transfer it by virtue of which
the assignor's right to performance by the obligor is extinguished in whole or in part and the
assignee acquires a right to such performance."); FARNSWORTH, supra note 65, § 11.3 ("It is
important not to confuse an assignment, which is a present transfer, with a contract, which is a
promise of future performance.").

73.

See Lemlich v. Bd. of Trustees, 385 A.2d 1185 (Del. Ch. 1978) (supporting the

proposition that, because rescission is a contract, it must be formed by offer and acceptance); Akers

v. J.B. Sedberry, Inc., 286 S.W.2d 617 (Tenn. 1955) (supporting the proposition that an offer to
resign terminates at the end of the face-to-face meeting at which it was tendered).
74. See Ricketts v. Penn. Ry. Co., 153 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1946) (applying contract doctrine of
unilateral mistake to release of wage claims).
75. See Wis. Knife Works v. Nat'l Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280 (7th Cir. 1986); U.C.C. § 2209(2) (AM. LAW INST. & UNITF. LAW COMM'N 1977).
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10. A and B agree to adopt a writing that integrates their oral
agreement, and thereby discharge all previous agreements
76
pertaining to that transaction.

'

After she realizes that none of these agreements necessarily involves a
promise or creates an enforceable obligation, the student would correctly, if
anxiously, answer "None of the above."
For example, she will have realized
that releases and rescissions extinguish rather than create obligations;7 8 that
choice of law agreements, disclaimers, consents, and permissions to use property
are not promises; 79 and that licenses and waivers of privacy and property rights
need impose no duties on either party.80
After the quiz, however, the student might ask, "If these agreements are not
contracts, then I assume that I will not study them in Contracts class."
The professor might answer, "Actually, your casebook contains many
opinions that deal with such agreements. You will study the rules and principles
relevant to their creation and enforcement. When you begin practicing, you will
negotiate, draft, and get into disputes about these agreements. The judges who
decide your disputes will often refer to these agreements as 'contracts' and will,
under that description, apply many of the rules of contract law to them."
"But why did I learn the official definitions of 'contract' if casebooks,
lawyers, and judges treat non-promissory agreements as contracts?"
It may first occur to the professor to answer that the agreements in the list
are not themselves "contracts" but are ancillary parts of agreements that all meet
the accepted definitions of contract. A choice of law agreement or warranty
disclaimer, for example, often appears as a term in a sales contract, which itself
creates a performance obligation for both buyer and seller. 8

76.

See U.C.C.

§ 2-202 (AM. LAW INST. &
§ 213 (AM. LAW INST.

UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1977); RESTATEMENT

1979) (explaining that a binding integrated
agreement discharges prior agreements to the extent that it is inconsistent with them).
77. Although none of the agreements in the list requires a new legal duty for its legal
efficacy, in practice many of them create ancillary rights and duties that are essential to the
agreement. Thus, an optionor may acquire a duty not to repudiate the underlying contract during the
option term. See infra Part IV.C.
78. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 283, 284 (AM. LAW INST. 1979)
(stating that releases and rescissions extinguish obligations).
79. See, e.g., M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15, 17 (1972) (enforcing a
forum-a selection clause in a "freely negotiated international commercial" contract);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (stating that releases and
rescissions extinguish obligations); Authorization Clause, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed.
2004); Choice-of-Law Clause, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004); Disclaimer, BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
80. See License, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (defining license as a
permission, not a duty); Waiver, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (defining waiver as a
voluntary relinquishment, not a duty).
81. See U.C.C. § 2-312(5) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1977); Dolly Wu, Timing
the Choice of Law by Contract, 9 Nw. J. OF TECH. & INTELLECTUAL PROP. 3 (2011) (discussing
choice of law agreements in sales contracts).
(SECOND)

OF CONTRACTS
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But this answer also fails. Even when they appear to be parasitic to a rights
contract, some of these agreements lead an existence quite independent of their
"host." Valid and enforceable dispute resolution agreements may be contained
in contracts that are themselves found to have been unenforceable for some
reason, such as lack of consideration, incompleteness, illegality, or fraud.82
Because it is construed as a separate contract, the dispute resolution agreement
can outlive its host, the rights agreement.83
More importantly, any of these "non-rights" agreements theoretically could,
and many of them commonly do, arise as free-standing agreements unattached to
a classical rights contract. Such free-standing agreements as releases, licenses,
consents, and options are nevertheless commonly referred to and treated as
"contracts."
An adequate answer to the student's question must begin by acknowledging
that the conventional definition of contract as only a promise or obligation is and
has always been misleading and underinclusive.
This flaw is tacitly
acknowledged at various points by the inclusion of privileges, powers, and
immunities in The Restatement of Contracts, the Uniform Commercial Code,
and in law school contracts casebooks.84 The listed examples are discussed in
contracts classes rather than in torts or property classes not because they all
involve enforceable promises but because they all concern personal, legal
relationships that result from agreement between the parties to the relationship.8 5
Moreover, in resolving disputes, both the courts and the Restatement also
tacitly or explicitly reclassify these non-obligations as contracts in order to apply
to them a body of legal and equitable contract rules and principles that concern
consideration and mutual assent.86 These include the objective theory of
contract,8 7 the parol evidence rule,88 reliance-based estoppel, 89 and the

82. See e.g., Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006) (holding that an
arbitration clause in a void or voidable agreement is enforceable).
83. Id.
84.

See U.C.C.

§

1-201 cmt. (AM. LAW INST. & UNITF. LAW COMM'N 1977); RESTATEMENT
§ 1 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 25 (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (explaining

(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

85.

that options are not merely enforceable promises, as they meet all of the requirements of a contract);
Id. § 284, illus. 1 (illustrating how a release concerns a personal legal relationship resulting from
agreement between the parties).
86. See Power Lift, Inc. v. Weatherford Nipple-Up Sys., Inc., 871 F.2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir.
1989) (explaining that a license agreement is a contract governed by ordinary principles of state
contract law); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 25

cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1979).

87. See Hershon v. Gibraltar Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, Inc., 684 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(interpreting release according to objective theory).
88. See Bell BCI Co. v. United States, 570 F.3d 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (stating that
parol evidence can only come in if the release is ambiguous); Empro Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Ball-Co
Mfg., Inc., 870 F.2d 423 (7th Cir. 1989) (applying the parol evidence rule to pre-contractual nonreliance letter); Wagner v. Graziano Constr. Co., 136 A.2d 82, 83-84 (Pa. 1957) (finding that there
was a no-oral-modification clause, but also finding a waiver); Rawlings v. Fields, 110 S.E. 499 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1921) (applying the parol evidence rule to a contract of rescission).
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consideration doctrine. 90
Because the reclassification is never openly
acknowledged, however, the doctrinal borrowings are not subjected to an
independent, functional analysis as they have been with rights contracts. As a
result, for example, the application of the consideration doctrine to privileges,
powers, and immunities has been arbitrary and inconsistent. 9 1
Corbin alone among the leading contracts scholars openly acknowledged the
92
embarrassing existence of "contracts" that do not create obligations.
He
referred to releases and assignments as "executed contracts," because they are
fully effective when formed and contemplate no future action by either party.93
Although he argued that our conception of "contract" should include such nonpromissory agreements, he gave little guidance about the range of such
agreements or how to account for them within the ambit of contract rules and
principles.94
This Article seeks to develop Corbin's insight, not only by
identifying additional non-rights agreements, but by acknowledging ways they
differ from rights contracts in mode of formation, legal effect, and economic
justification.
What then is a contract under a more comprehensive view? A contract
broadly conceived is any binding, personal legal relationship created by the
agreement of the parties to the relationship. Personal legal relationships include
any combinations of rights, privileges, powers, and immunities that bind the
95
parties to the agreement.
Such a comprehensive concept of contract is necessary to rationalize the law
of private ordering. Agreements that create non-rights legal relations will remain
"under-theorized" so long as they remain unnamed and invisible.
Once
acknowledged as different members of the contracts family, however, non-rights
relations can be subjected to the policy-based, normative questions that we have
posed for the creation of agreement-based obligations: Who has the capacity to

89. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 65, § 4.23 (stating that discharge of debt may become
enforceable through debtor's reliance).
90. Cloud Corp. v. Hasbro, Inc., 314 F.3d 289 (7th Cir. 2002) (suggesting that a modification
adding a no-oral-modification clause required consideration).
91. See Val D. Ricks, The SophisticatedDoctrine of Consideration,9 GEO. MASON L. REV.
99, 99-101 (2000) (exploring the inconsistencies of the application of the consideration doctrine).
92. CORBIN, supra note 1, § 1.3 ("Another difficulty with the equating of contract with
promise is that it ignores the array of consensual transactions that can be called 'executed
contracts.' . . . Covenants were used to make binding promises but also to transfer rights in land and
chattels as well as to assign and discharge intangible rights."). See also Edwin W. Patterson, The
Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 33 COLUM. L. REv. 397, 411 (1933) (noting the absence in the
Restatement of such non-rights agreements, including waivers and grants).
93. But see Corbin, supra note 21, at 172 (questioning the use of this term when referring to
barter as misleading).
94. See CORBIN, supra note 1, § 1.3 (explaining why the term "contract" should include nonpromissory agreements).
95. Cf Ayers, supra note 1, at 899 (offering a very similar definition: "an area of law should
be considered contractual if parties can privately reorder a substantial portion of their legal
relations").
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create this relationship? Do parties have the power to create this relationship by
agreement? Should certain forms be necessary or sufficient for its creation?
Should this relationship require consideration in order to be binding? When if
ever should judicial recognition of this relationship be refused?
With regard to rights contracts, these questions have been largely resolved
96
by courts, whose resolutions have been given critical analysis by scholars. But
these questions can be satisfactorily answered for non-rights contracts only by
first recognizing that, while differing from rights, they are nevertheless binding
legal relations. They may then be subjected to a consent-focused, functional
analysis that takes such difference into account. An analysis of the precise
nature of privileges, powers, and immunities requires descriptive language that
clarifies the legal effects of these relationships. The simplest and most enduring
such language was provided by Wesley Hohfeld.97
A.

Hohfeld's FundamentalConceptions

A century ago, Wesley Hohfeld published two articles that he hoped would
reform judicial reasoning by clarifying what he called the "fundamental
conceptions" of private law.98 Hohfeld's analysis of judicial decisions in various
common law doctrinal areas led him to believe that many courts had reached
unsupportable results because they had confused the concept of a legal "right"
with three related concepts: privilege, power, and immunity. 99 Each of the four
elemental terms that Hohfeld identified referred to a distinct legal relationship
with its own effect on the adjudication of legal disputes. 00 He contended that
these four relationships, properly understood, were the irreducible constituents of
the private legal order, and he hoped to induce courts and lawyers to recognize
and differentiate among them more precisely.101
Hohfeld argued that rigorously "correct" analytical differentiation of these
legal concepts would assist in the solution to legal problems by clarifying the
relationships among the elements of a legal system.102 It is, of course, true that

96. See May v. Anderson, 119 P.3d 1254, 1257 (Nev. 2005); Shawn J. Bayern, Offer and
Acceptance in Modern Contract Law: A Needless Concept, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 67, 68 (2015)
(providing examples of how courts have answered these questions about rights contracts, as well as
critical analysis by scholars).
97. See Hohfeld, FundamentalConceptionsl, supra note 23, at 18-20, 28-29.
98. See id.; Hohfeld, FundamentalConceptions II, supra note 35, at 710-12.
99. See Hohfeld, Fundamental Conceptions I, supra note 23, at 30; Hohfeld, Fundamental
Conceptions II, supra note 35, at 717.
100. See Hohfeld, Fundamental Conceptions I, supra note 23, at 28-30; Hohfeld,
FundamentalConceptions II, supra note 35, at 710-12.
101. See Hohfeld, Fundamental Conceptions I, supra note 23, at 58-59; Hohfeld,
FundamentalConceptions II, supra note 35, at 712-713.
102. See Wesley N. Hohfeld, Faulty Analysis in Easement and License Cases, 27 YALE L.J.
66, 69-74 (1917).
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most of today's legal problems are resolved by pragmatic policy analysis1 03
rather than conceptualist deduction.
Nevertheless, conceptual clarity and
precision can prevent certain kinds of judicial errors that arise when courts
attempt to articulate and then to follow the rules that emerge from such policy
analysis.1 04 The imprecision that Hohfeld criticized in judicial reasoning of his
day about "rights" characterizes much contemporary judicial reasoning about
"contracts": Courts continue to confuse contractual rights with contractual
privileges, powers, and immunities, with practical as well as conceptual
consequences. 105
Hohfeld's innovation was to operationalize legal concepts by reference to
their effects on judicial decisions.106 The fundamental unit of analysis in
Hohfeld's system is the personal legal relation, which unites exactly two persons
and stipulates the legal effect of an action that one of them might take. 0 7 There
are four such fundamental relations, two of which are simply the absences or
negations of the other two: right/duty; no-right/privilege; power/liability; and
disability/immunity. 10s
1.

Right/Duty

A person who has a duty has a legally enforceable obligation to act or refrain
from acting in a specific way.1 09 The person who may enforce the duty has the
correlative right to the performance."1 0 This is the only kind of "right" properly
so called in Hohfeldian description."'

103. See RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 41-43, 230-32 (2008) (advocating
pragmatism as both a descriptive and normative philosophy of judging). See also Corbin, supra
note 27 (observing that Hohfeld's categories have practical utility); Duncan Kennedy, From the Will
Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller's "Consideration and Form," 100
COLUM. L. REV. 94, 94 (2000) (theorizing that contract issues are resolved on the basis of
conflicting formal, substantive, and institutional considerations).
104. See Corbin, supra note 27.
105. See Hohfeld, FundamentalConceptions II, supra note 35, at 724.
106. See Hohfeld, FundamentalConceptions I, supra note 23, at 25 ("Operative, constitutive,
causal or 'dispositive' facts which under the general legal rules that are applicable, suffice to change
legal relations, that is, either to create a new relation, or to extinguish an old one, or to perform both
of these fundamental simultaneously.").
107. See id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 30, 32, 55 (theorizing that each of the four fundamental legal relationships has two
halves that are merely two perspectives on the same legal fact, neither of which can exist without
the other).
110. See id. at 31-32. See also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP.: INTRODUCTION AND
FREEHOLD ESTATES § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1936) (adopting Hohfeld's definition).
111. See Hohfeld, Fundamental Conceptions I, supra note 23, at 31-32. See also Hohfeld,
FundamentalConceptions II, supra note 35, at 717 (theorizing that the synonym "claim" is the best
equivalent of "right"). But see, e.g., J.E. Penner, The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property, 43
UCLA L. REV. 711, 712 (1995) (replacing Hohfeld's use of the word "right" with "claim-right");
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Examples of true rights include the right of a property owner to exclude
others from her property, the right of a person not to be negligently injured by
another person, and the right of a contract promisee to receive the promised
performance.112 The potential trespasser, the potential tortfeasor, and the
contract promisor in these examples each has a corresponding duty to act or
refrain from acting in the prescribed way. Breach of that duty will usually
subject the breaching duty-holder to a claim for a legal remedy brought by the
rights-holder for any harm caused by the breach."13
2.

No-right/Privilege

This is the absence of a particular right/duty.1 4 A person who has no duty
to act in a specific way has a privilege not to act;" 5 a person who has no duty to
refrain from acting in a specific way has a privilege to act.116 In each case, every
person to whom he owes no duty has "no-right" 117 to his performance. For
example, non-owners of property have no right to exclude others from its use; a
property owner who has granted a license permitting a person to use her property
has no right that the licensee refrain from such use; and the promisee of an
unenforceable promise has no right that the promisor perform it." The nontrespasser, the licensee, and the promisor in these examples each has a privilege
(not a right) to act or refrain from acting in the designated way without incurring
legal liability to the "no-right" holder.' 19

Max Radin, A Restatement of Hohfeld, 51 HARV. L. REV., 1141, 1149, 1151 (1938) (replacing
Hohfeld's use of the word "right" with "demand-right").
112. See generally Hohfeld, Fundamental Conceptions I, supra note 23, at 32 (illustrating
several examples of "true rights").
113. See Hohfeld, Fundamental Conceptions II, supra note 35, at 760 (illustrating that breach
of duty results in claim for a legal remedy brought by rights-holder). Compare Arthur L Corbin,
Does a Pre-ExistingDuty Defeat Consideration? Recent Noteworthy Decisions, 27 YALE L.J. 362,
363 (1917) (explaining that a breach of contract created a new duty to pay damages), with Walter
Wheeler Cook, The Powers of Courts of Equity, 15 COLUM. L. REV. 37, 45 (1915) ("The 'right to
damages' on analysis, appears to consist of (1) a privilege, and (2) a power with the corresponding
liability." (footnote omitted)), and Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law
of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 80-81 (1998) (explaining that remedial entitlements are powers, not
duties; violation of a duty and creation of a remedial entitlement does not create a duty of
recompense in the defendant).
114. See Hohfeld, FundamentalConceptions I, supra note 23, at 32.
115. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP.: INTRODUCTION AND FREEHOLD ESTATES § 2 (AM.
LAW INST. 1936). See also Hohfeld, Fundamental Conceptions I, supra note 23, at 32-33
(explaining the dominant technical meaning of privilege is negation of a legal duty).
116. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP.: INTRODUCTION AND FREEHOLD ESTATES § 2 (AM.
LAW INST. 1936).
117. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP.: INTRODUCTION AND FREEHOLD ESTATES § 2 cmt.
a (AM. LAW INST. 1936). See also Hohfeld, Fundamental Conceptions I, supra note 23, at 33
(creating the term "no-right," an unfortunate neologism Hohfeld created because no existing legal
term had that meaning).
118. See Hohfeld, FundamentalConceptions I, supra note 23, at 33.
119. Id.
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3.

Power/Liability

A person who has the ability to create or extinguish a legal relationship by a
voluntary act has a power.120 Any person who will be a party to the legal
relation thus created or extinguished is under a corresponding liability.121 For
example, the owner of property has the power to transfer title to a grantee; a
property owner who has granted a gratuitous license to use her property has the
power to revoke it; and a contract offeree has the power to create contract
relations by accepting the offer.122 The property grantee, the gratuitous licensee,
and the offeror in these examples are each under a corresponding liability (or
vulnerability) to become a party to the new legal relationship created by the other
party's exercise of the power (not right).123
4.

Disability/Immunity

This is the absence of a particular power/liability.1 24 A person who lacks the
power to create or extinguish a legal relation by a voluntary act has a
disability.125 Any person who is or would be a party to that legal relation has a
corresponding immunity.126 An owner of non-negotiable property is immune
from being divested of title by someone who misappropriates the property; a
contract offeror who has revoked the offer is immune from the offeree's later
attempted acceptance; and a contract offeree who has accepted is immune from
the offeror's later attempted revocation of the offer.127 The misappropriator, the
offeree, and the offeror in these examples each has the corresponding disability
to create the legal relationships in question.128
Because any relationship can be described by referring to the position of the
party who has the right, privilege, power, or immunity, that usage will be
followed in this Article. Moreover, Hohfeld's system is so tightly constructed
that the extinction of any Hohfeldian relationship is ipso facto the creation of the
opposite one relating to the same act and the same parties.129 Thus, all private

120. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP.: INTRODUCTION AND FREEHOLD ESTATES
LAW INST. 1936); Hohfeld, FundamentalConceptions I, supra note 23, at 44-45.
121. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP.: INTRODUCTION AND FREEHOLD ESTATES
a (AM. LAW INST. 1936).
122. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP.: INTRODUCTION AND FREEHOLD ESTATES

§3

(AM.

§3

cmt.

§2

illus.

§4

cmt.

1-3 (AM. LAW INST. 1936).
123. Id.
124. See Hohfeld, FundamentalLegal ConceptionsI, supra note 23, at 55.
125. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP.: INTRODUCTION AND FREEHOLD ESTATES

a (AM. LAW INST. 1936).
126. See Hohfeld, FundamentalConceptions I, supra note 23, at 55.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See Corbin, supra note 27, at 167 ("The 'extinguishment' of a legal relation is necessarily
the creation of a new one.").
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legal (re)ordering is accurately described as the creation of one or more rights,
privileges, powers, and immunities. 3 0
Although every Hohfeldian relationship unites exactly two persons, the set
of such relationships created by a legally operative event may be either in
personam or in rem.131 In general, in personam relations are created between
two determinate persons.132 For that reason, this Article will use the term
"personal" for such relations. In rem relations are created between a person and
an indeterminate number of others, each of whom has a discrete personal relation
to the owner.1 33 This Article will refer to such relations as "property" relations.
For example, the personal rights created by a contract are enforceable only
against the counter-party to the agreement, while a land owner's rights protected
by property law are enforceable against everyone else in the world. Property
relations also include the rights to personal security enforced under the law of
torts. 134

Rights are distinguished from privileges, powers, and immunities in their
legal effects on judicial proceedings. 135 Because "breach" means the failure to
perform a legal duty,136 the concept of breach of contract applies only to rightscontracts.137 Failure to do what you have a duty to do is a breach of your duty.138
But neither party can breach a privilege, power, or immunity. 139 Instead, these

130.
131.
personam
132.
133.

See generally id.
See Hohfeld, Fundamental Conceptions II, supra note 35, at 718 (referring to in
relations as "paucital" and to in rem relations as "multital").
See id. at 729.
See id. at 719, 723, 733. See also id. at 718 n.20 ("The right of a person not to be struck

by another is both multital and general.").
134. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1965) ("[L]egally

protected interests are given legal protection, generally against all the world, so that everyone is
under a duty not to invade the interest. . . ."). See also Hohfeld, Fundamental Conceptions II,
supra note 35, at 720 n.23 (explaining property relations are always constructive rather than
consensual, arising independently "of even an approximate expression of intention on the part of
those concerned"); id. ("This explains, no doubt, why most, if not all, of such duties are negative in
character: it is just and politic to spread such merely negative duties broadcast; whereas precisely
the opposite would be true in the case of most kinds of affirmative duties."). See generally Hohfeld,
Fundamental Conceptions II, supra note 35, at 733-34, 743-44 (illustrating several examples of
property relations and the rights to personal security).
135. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP.: INTRODUCTION AND FREEHOLD ESTATES §§ 1-4
(AM. LAW INST. 1936).
136. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 4 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
137. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 115 (Penelope A. Bulloch & Joseph Raz eds.,
2nd ed. 1994) (observing that the concept of "obedience," as appropriate to primary, duty-imposing
legal rules, but inapt to describe the behavior of private and public parties in the exercise of powers
that are delimited by legal rules).
138. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP.: INTRODUCTION AND FREEHOLD ESTATES § 1 cmt.
a (AM. LAW INST. 1936); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 4 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
139. John Harrison, The ConstitutionalOrigins and Implications ofJudicialReview, 84 VA. L.
REV. 333, 340-41 (1998) ("[O]ne cannot really violate rules about power. One who fails to comply
with such a rule, for example by failing to seal one's contract for the sale of land, has not done
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relations have legal effects that will determine the resolution of legal disputes in
a different way.1 40 A creditor cannot breach a release, for example, but he will
suffer dismissal if he seeks to enforce the released claim. A contract party
cannot breach a no-oral modification clause, but her attempted modification may
be unenforceable. A buyer cannot breach a warranty disclaimer, but his claim
for breach of warranty may be dismissed. A promisee cannot breach a nonreliance clause by relying, but her reliance-based claim will be dismissed if she
does. 141
Although privileges, powers, and immunities cannot be breached in practice
(although not in Hohfeldian theory), they are nevertheless binding commitments
with normative significance. Attempting to renege on one's agreement is
analogous to breaking a promise or telling a lie: it isn't playing the game you
agreed to play and it disappoints expectations that you intentionally fostered.
Courts might well choose to sanction behavior that is harmful and unjustified in
light of an agreed privilege, power, or immunity.142 If so, they will create
associated rights and duties that are collateral to the privilege, power, or
immunity.
One aspect of Hohfeld's descriptive system that has produced an odd but
continuing controversy is that it is purely positive and formal.143 It is a
descriptive rather than normative system.1 44 And although Hohfeld refers to
fundamental legal "conceptions," his system is not a way of drawing valid
inferences from controlling concepts, such as the nature of a trust or a contract.
The Hohfeldian system offers a way to describe what courts will do in fact, and
bears no relation to the interests of the parties to the four legal relations.
Whether any particular relation exists is purely a question of positive law to be
determined by the courts on grounds that are utterly independent of Hohfeldian
analysis.
To some scholars, Hohfeld's system was a reductive and totalizing vision of
private law.1 45

His controversial

"negative" legal relations

46

step of recognizing and naming the

privileges and immunities-implied that each person

anything bad and is not made any worse off as a result. Rather, the action that fails to satisfy the rule
about power is simply a legal nullity.").
140. See id.
141. See infra Part IV.B (discussing non-reliance agreements).
142. For example, a licensor may have an implied duty to facilitate the licensee's use of the
licensed property. An optionor may have an implied duty not to repudiate the optioned offer before
its exercise. See infra Part IV.C.
143. See Thomas G. Kelch, The Role of the Rational and the Emotive in a Theory ofAnimal
Rights, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 1, 8 (1999) (describing the Hohfeldian theory as primarily
descriptive); Pierre Schlag, How to Do Things with Hohfeld, 78 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 18889 (2015) (discussing Hohfeld's approach as formalistic).
144. See Kelch, supra at note 143, at 8.
145. See John S. Harbison, Hohfeld and Herefords: The Concept of Property and the Law of
the Range, 22 N.M. L. REv. 459, 466 (1992).
146. See generally Albert Kocourek, Non-Legal-Content Relations, 4 ILL. L. Q. 233 (1922)
(discussing that Hohfeldian privilege and immunity are not legal relations).
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is always at the center of an infinite web of potential,1 47 personal, and property
relations connecting her to every other person in the world. These background,
or default relations, spring into existence at birth and are thereafter continuously
formed and re-formed by public and private re-ordering. In theory, any fiber in
this web can be replaced by a new, opposite one created through someone's
exercise of a power. This transformative power of private ordering is the
province of the law of contract.
Hohfeld's conceptual system was enthusiastically embraced by American
legal scholars of the early twentieth century.1 48 For example, the first four
sections of the Restatement of Property adopted verbatim Hohfeld's definitions
of "right,"1 49 "power,",150 " privilege,"1 5 ' and "immunity,"152 and endorsed his
stated goal of "clarity of thought and exactness of expression"'1 53 in correctly
analyzing the four relations.1 54 Property ownership is described as a complex or
aggregate of the four discrete legal relations, '5 often analogized to a bundle of
sticks or twigs.156

147. The infinite number of negative relations, such as no-rights and disabilities, that relate
everyone to everyone else, are imaginary and are actualized only in specific judicial proceedings.
148. See, e.g., Mark Andrews, Hohfeld's Cube, 16 AKRON L. REv. 471, 471 & n.2 (1983);
George W. Globe, FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied in JudicialReasoning, 23 COLUM.
L. REv. 502, 502 & n.2 (1923) (reviewing WESLEY N. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL
CONCEPTIONS aS APPLIED iN JUDICIAL REASONING, AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS (Walter. W. Cook
ed. 1919)) (stating that American legal scholars have widely embraced Hohfeld's system).
149. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP.: INTRODUCTION AND FREEHOLD ESTATES § 1 (AM.
LAW INST. 1936).
150. Id. § 2.
151. Id. § 3.
152. Id. § 4.
153. Id. at ch. 1, intro. note.
154. Id. ("Legal relations between persons can be of widely differing types. Clarity of thought
and exactness of expression require the analysis and subdivision of legal relations into types having
different significances. This analysis is made in §§ 1-4 defining respectively those legal relations
designated by the words "right," "privilege," "power," and "immunity.").
155. Moore v. Regents of the U. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 510 (Cal. 1990) (Mosk, J., dissenting)
(quoting People v. Walker, 90 P.2d 854, 855 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939)) ("Since property or title is a
complex bundle of rights, duties, powers and immunities, the pruning away of some or a great many
of these elements does not entirely destroy the title . . . ."). See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP.:
INTRODUCTION AND FREEHOLD ESTATES § 5 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1936) ("The totality of these
rights, privileges, powers and immunities which it is legally possible for a person to have with
regard to a given piece of land, or with regard to a thing other than land, that are other than those
which all other members of society have as such, constitutes complete property in such land or thing
other than land. This totality varies from time to time, and from place to place, either because of
changes in the common law, or because of alterations by statute."). See also Corbin, supra note 27,
at 165 (describing property not as a single legal right, but rather as a complex and variable
aggregate of legal relations).
156. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. INTRODUCTION AND FREEHOLD ESTATES ch. 1,
intro. note, §§ 1-5 (AM. LAW INST. 1936) (implying that "rights," "privileges," powers," and
"immunities," are the "bundle"). Hohfeld did not use the term "bundle" but instead referred to the
"complex aggregate" of relations. See Hohfeld, Fundamental Conceptions I, supra note 23, at 24;
Hohfeld, Fundamental Conceptions II, supra note 35, at 746. The first to conceive of property
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Although the Restatement of Contracts did not so completely adopt
Hohfeld's descriptive system, the assistant reporter, Arthur Corbin, was
Hohfeld's most influential and enthusiastic champion.
As a consequence,
both the Restatement and its commentary scrupulously observe Hohfeld's
usages; a practice that was continued in the Second Restatement. 58
Hohfeld's idea of aggregations, or bundles of legal relations, obviously
applies to much more than property ownership: the four fundamental relations
are the irreducible, atomic components of all complex private legal relations,
including bailments, licenses, leases, trusts, agencies, partnerships, corporations,
marriages, and contracts.
B.

Contracts as Bundles ofRights, Powers, Privileges, and Immunities

Such terms of the law as 'contract' . . . do not represent a single legal
relation; they describe and represent complex and variable aggregates of
legal relations. 159
Long before the deceptive simplicity of the Restatementl60 and Uniform
Commercial Code definitions, Corbin had adopted Hohfeld's terminology and
his insight: the formation of a contract brings about not only new duties and their
correlative rights, but also new privileges, powers, and immunities.161 A
contract is just another bundle of twigs. Some of these relations, which this
Article calls "coeval relations," arise automatically at the moment of contract
formation.162 Coeval relations thus include all the implied rights and duties that
have been held to supplement the express terms of the contract agreement, such

interests as "bundles" of rights may have been Frederick William Maitland.

See I FREDERICK
WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF FREDERICK WILLIAM MAITLAND: THE
MYSTERY OF SEISEN 373 (H. A. L. Fisher ed. 1911) ("Ownership is a right or bundle of rights.").
157. See Daniel P. O'Gorman, Redefining Offer in ContractLaw, 82 MIss. L.J. 1049, 1061-62
(2013). See generally ROSCOE POUND & KARL LLEWELLYN, SEARCHING FOR AN AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE 103 (N. E. H. Hull ed., 1997) (describing Corbin's interest and support in the
publication of Hohfled's article, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning).
158. See O'Gorman, supra note 157, at 1060-63.
159. Corbin, supra note 27, at 165.
160. Perhaps because of Corbin's influence, the comments to the Restatement do acknowledge
that it is common to define "contract" not to refer to a promise that the law will enforce but to "the
resulting legal obligation, or to the entire resulting complex of legal relations." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (emphasis added).
161. See Corbin, supra note 21, at 169 ("The term contract has been used without much
discrimination to refer to three different things: . . . (3) the relations resulting from the operative
acts, consisting of a . . right in personam and the corresponding duties, accompanied by certain
powers, privileges and immunities.").
162. See, e.g., Willis, supra note 32, at 182 (explaining that in forming a contract, parties are
free to determine all of their rights and duties and some powers, privileges and immunities under the
contract).
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as the duty of good faith. 16 In addition, formation of a contract creates coeval
powers whereby one or both parties may thereafter alter or extinguish the other
relations, e.g., by performance, breach, release, waiver, modification, rescission,
satisfaction of constructive conditions, or assignment.164 Formation of a contract
also creates coeval immunities that "protect" the other newly-created relations,
and, as a result, they cannot be unilaterally abrogated by either party without the
consent of the other. 16 This is what is meant by saying that even a privilege,
power, or immunity is "binding."1 66
In addition to the coeval relations that arise with the formation of every
contract, the express terms of a contract create other personal relations of all four
types.167 These terms alter both the default relations168 that would otherwise
exist as "background" legal relationships created by law or that would arise as a
coeval consequence of contract formation.169 Some of these terms, such as
express warranties17 0 and liquidated damages'17

provisions, create additional

contract duties or remedial claims.172
Most of them, however, do not. Measured by number of words, the modem
commercial contract document consists predominantly of express terms that
create privileges, powers, and immunities rather than rights and duties. Among

163. U.C.C. § 1-203 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. COMM'N 1977) ("Every contract or duty within
the Uniform Commercial Code imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance and
enforcement."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) ("Every
contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its
enforcement.").
164. See, e.g., Willis, supra note 32, at 182 (explaining that the same formalities for the
making of contracts also applies to the unmaking, or discharge, of contracts, and to the legal redress
for breach of contracts).
165. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 283 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
166. The binding or irrevocable nature of a contract is a central phenomenological
characteristic of contract liability when a party finds itself unable to avoid a regretted obligation.
See generally E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CHANGING YOUR MIND: THE LAW OF REGRETTED
DECISIONS (1998) (explaining that the law, particularly the law of contracts imposes limits on our
freedom to change our minds).
167. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 65, § 1.10 (explaining that parties frequently exercise their
power to state expressly their own provisions at the time of their agreement).
168. "Default" rules are those that can be changed by agreement, but that will otherwise
govern a contract. Id.
169. Id.
170. U.C.C. § 2-313 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. COMM'N 1977). An express warranty creates
an obligation to tender conforming goods. Id.
171. U.C.C. § 2-718 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. COMM'N 1977) ("Damages for breach by either
party may be liquidated but only at the amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or
actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 356 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
172. See, e.g., Glenn D. West & W. Benton Lewis, Jr., Contracting to Avoid ExtraContractual Liability-Can Your ContractualDeal Ever Really Be the "Entire" Deal?, 64 BUS.
LAW. 999 (2009) (explaining the extra-contractual liability that may arise from contractual
obligation found in express warranties).
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these are terms that concern choice of law;1 73 venue and forum selection;1 74
arbitration;
consent to personal jurisdiction;176 remedy limitations;
waivers
of the right to jury trial;17 8 non-reliance clauses;1 79 powers of assignment and
restrictions on assignability;1 80 consent to assignment or delegation;
interpretation standards;
express conditions;182 agreements to conduct business
electronically;1 83 the legal effects of written and oral modification;1 84 risk-of-

173. U.C.C. § 1-301 (Am. LAW INST. & UNIF. COMM'N 2002) (expressing parties' power to
choose applicable law).
174. See generally Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. United States D. for W. D. of Tex., 134 S. Ct.
568 (2013) (noting forum selection clause in contract should be given effect in federal court, unless
public interest dictates otherwise); M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1972)
(explaining that forum selection clauses are prima facie valid, and giving them effect is in accord
with "ancient concepts of freedom of contract").
175. See generally Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395 (1967) (stating
that, under United States Arbitration Act, a claim of fraud in inducement as to an entire contract was
for arbitrators under the arbitration clause).
176. Nat'l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 316 (1964) ("[P]arties to a contract
may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a given court, to permit notice to be served by
the opposing party, or even to waive notice altogether.").
177. U.C.C. §§ 2-718 to -719 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. COMM'N 1977) (explaining liquidation
or limitation of damages); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(explaining liquidated damages and penalties).
178. Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 832 (4th Cir. 1986) ("The seventh
amendment right is of course a fundamental one, but it is one that can be knowingly and
intentionally waived by contract."); Fairfield Leasing Corp. v. Techni-Graphics, Inc., 607 A.2d 703,
705 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1992) ("Jury trial may be waived if done knowingly and intentionally,
but courts will indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver.") (citing Aetna Ins. Co. v.
Kennedy to Use of Bogash, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937); Rodenbur v. Kaufmann, 320 F.2d 679, 683
(D.C. Cir. 1963)).
179. If given legal effect, a non-reliance agreement prevents a party's reliance on the other
party's words or conduct from creating a waiver or estoppel or obligation, creating an immunity.
Sidney W. DeLong, Placid, Clear-Seeming Words: Some Realism About the New Formalism (with
ParticularReference to Promissory Estoppel), 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 13, 28 (2001).
180. See Travertine Corp. v. Lexington-Silverwood, 683 N.W.2d 267, 272 (Minn. 2004);
U.C.C. § 2-210 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. COMM'N 1977) (explaining assignment of rights);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 322 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (explaining contractual
prohibition of assignment).
181. See Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 N.W.U.L. REV.
847, 851 (2000) (explaining that courts should defer to parties' express stipulation of interpretive
strategy).
182. Arthur L. Corbin, Conditions in the Law of Contract, 28 YALE. L.J. 739, 743-74 (1918)
(stating that express conditions consisting of an act by one of the parties create a power in the
person whose action constitutes the condition); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 230
(AM. LAW INST. 1981) (stating that non-promissory express considerations are not obligations).
183. UNIF. ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT § 5(b) (UNIF. COMM'N 2007) ("This [Act]
applies only to transactions between parties each of which has agreed to conduct transactions by
electronic means.").
184. See U.C.C. § 2-209(2) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. COMM'N 1977); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 27 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1981). Such an agreement creates an
immunity to the legal relations that would otherwise be created by an oral contract modification.
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disclaimers of warranty;186 negligence disclaimers;

notice-of-breach

requirements; 188 complaint procedures;189 substantive remedy limitations;1 90 and
provisions giving parties the power to modify, reduce, or terminate the
contractual relationship, with or without consideration.191 Under the parol
evidence rule, a merger clause that adopts a writing as a final expression of an
existing agreement discharges all prior inconsistent rights, privileges, powers,
and immunities to which the parties had agreed.192
Additional non-rights contractual relations, such as signed-writing
requirements and non-reliance provisions,1 93 appear in letters of intent before the
contract is formed. Others, such as waivers of express conditions,1 94 releases,1 95
and agreements to rescind,196 arise after the contract is formed.
Even cursory analysis reveals that none of the foregoing contract terms or
agreements entails a promise or obligation as its primary featurel97 and none

.

185. Risk of loss agreements create a power to transfer risk because risk of loss agreements
stipulate when and how risk of loss is to transfer from the seller to the buyer in a sales agreement.
See U.C.C. §§ 2-319 to -322 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. COMM'N 1977).
186. See U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNITF. COMM'N 1977) (suggesting that if a
disclaimer of warranty extinguishes an existing duty of tendering conforming goods, then it creates
a privilege; if it prevents one from arising in a later sale, it creates an immunity).
187. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 8, topic 4, intro. note (AM. LAW INST.
1981) ("One party can ordinarily . . contract out of his duty to exercise reasonable care with
respect to the other party and thereby exonerate himself of liability to him for negligence. .
(citation omitted); id. § 195(2) (limiting the introductory comment for reasons of public policy).
188. Cameo Homes v. Kraus Anderson Constr. Co., 394 F.3d 1084, 1088 (8th Cir. 2005)
(explaining that contract required contractor to give written notice of claims against city to architect,
absent which claim is barred).
189. Sarmiento v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 835 N.E.2d 692, 696 (Ohio 2005) (stating that
contract reduced the statute of limitations for the insured to file suit to two years).
190. U.C.C. § 2-719 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. COMM'N 1977). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS

§ 356 (Am. LAW INST.

1981).

&

191. For example, in "pay or play" contracts, one party is given the power to terminate its duty
of performance upon the payment of a fee to the other party. See, e.g., VICTOR GOLDBERG,
FRAMING CONTRACT LAW 277-78 (2006).
192. The parties' adoption of an integration of an oral agreement has the legal effect of
discharging all inconsistent agreements concerning the same transaction and, if the integration is
complete, all agreements within the scope of the transaction. U.C.C. § 2-202 (AM. LAW INST.
UNITF. COMM'N 1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 213(1)

(AM. LAW INST. 1981)

("A binding integrated agreement discharges prior agreements to the extent that it is inconsistent
with them."); id. at cmt. a (stating that a binding integrated document "renders inoperative prior
written agreements as well as prior oral agreements"). See also Arthur L. Corbin, The Parol
Evidence Rule, 53 YALE L. J. 603, 606 n.5 (1944).
193. See infra Part IV.B.
194. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 225 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(discussing "excuse" and "waiver" of the non-occurrence of a condition).
195. See id. §§ 284(1)-(2) (referencing id. §§ 101-03).
196. Id. § 283.
197. See id. § 2 (defining "promise" as "[a] manifestation of intention to act or refrain from
acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has
been made"). Any of the listed legal relations may, of course, include rights and duties as ancillary
elements.
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necessarily creates any new obligation.1 98 This should not be surprising. The
drafters of standardized contracts generally aim to reduce rather than increase the
number of default rights and powers that the adhering parties would otherwise
have. Thus, most of the written terms that appear in standardized contracts
create not duties, but privileges, powers, and immunities that benefit their
drafters at the expense of the adhering parties.1 99
In sum, as a purely descriptive matter, the contemporary, authoritative
definitions of contract are seriously incomplete in referring solely to enforceable
promises or obligations.200 A contract is not simply an enforceable promise or
an obligation arising from an agreement. 20 1 As with any other complex legal
relationship, formation of a contract creates an innumerable aggregate of discrete
legal relations that arise both as necessarily incident to the creation of any
202
contractual duty and as contingent features of particular agreements.22 In this
respect, despite Corbin's influence, the Restatement of Contracts is less accurate
in its definition of "contract" than the Restatement of Property is in its definition
of "ownership."203
C.

Privileges, Powers, and Immunities as DiscreteAgreements

A defender of the Restatement definition might grudgingly concede that the
classical definition of contract should be amended to include all of the ancillary
legal relations that are created at the time of formation of a rights contract, but
would insist that it should nevertheless retain the right/duty relationship as its

198. See CORBIN, supra note 1, § 1.2.
199. See, e.g., Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Master Engraving Co., 527 A.2d 429 (N.J. 1987)
("[F]or many sellers, immunity from liability for their customers' consequential damages may be
indispensable to their pricing structure and, in extreme cases, to their solvency."). See also Roy
Ryden Anderson, FailureofEssentialPurpose and EssentialFailureon Purpose:A Look at Section
2-719 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 31 Sw. L.J. 759, 774 (1977) ("[C]onsequential damages
exclusions are hands down the most significant limitation of liability in a contract for the sale of
goods.").
200. Interestingly, although the Restatement limits its definition of contract to only one of the
Hohfeldian relations, it recognizes that the creation of any legal relation may be consideration for a
promise as can the operative act necessary to effect the change. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 71 (3)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) ("The performance may consist of . . the creation,
modification, or destruction of a legal relation."). See also CORBIN, supra note 1, § 132.
201. See CORBIN, supra note 1, § 1.3 (arguing that a contract is much more than merely a
promise or agreement).
202. See id. ("A study of its common usage will show that the term 'contract' has been made
to denote three different kinds of things in various combinations . . . (3) the legal relations resulting
from the operative acts of the parties, always including the relation of right in one party and duty in
the other.").
203. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
with RESTATEMENT (FIRST) PF PROP.: INTRODUCTION AND FREEHOLD ESTATES § 10 cmt. a (AM.
LAW INST. 1936).
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204

sine qua non.
Although privileges, powers, and immunities may be intrinsic
to all contracts, on this view they are merely adjectival, modifying the rightscreating terms and incapable of an independent existence. Their existence and
legal efficacy depend on the creation and enforceability of the rights-creating
part of the agreement. A bundle of such relationships lacking a right/duty
relation as its central element would not be a contract; it would be a bundle of
adjectives lacking a noun.
The problem with this modest adjustment of the rights-centered,
conventional view of contract is that not all deliberately created privileges,
205
Agreements creating
powers, and immunities are ancillary to rights contracts.
privileges, powers, and immunities are perfectly capable of standing alone, both
206
in theory and, more importantly, in practice.
Common examples discussed
below include releases, disclaimers, licenses, dispute resolution agreements,
207
and non-reliance agreements. 20 8 Moreover,
options, arbitration agreements,
privileges, powers, and immunities that appear to be only subordinate parts of a
rights contract, such as choice-of-law and arbitration agreements, in practice
have a separate existence and do not depend on the existence of a valid rights
209
contract from which to derive their efficacy.
Privileges, powers, and
immunities should not be thought of as derivative attributes of rights but as
discrete legal relationships.
Three commonplace examples should clarify this point.
1. After entering a long-term supply contract, Buyer and Seller execute a
separate agreement agreeing that all disputes arising under their supply contract
will be governed by the law of Idaho and will be subject to mandatory arbitration
in Denver, Colorado.
2. Before negotiating the terms of their franchise agreement, Franchisor and
Franchisee execute a written agreement that no promises or representations of
fact will be actionable and no obligations will be binding unless and until a
definitive agreement is executed and signed by both parties.
3. A social media services provider obtains assent from each of its users
permitting it to market their personal data to third parties.

204. See Corbin, supra note 21, at 171 (stating that a simultaneous exchange of property, i.e. a
barter, creates new legal relations but not a contract).
205. See Murphy v. CBS Radio East, Inc., No. 10C4403, 2010 WL 4340212, at 3 (N.D. Ill.
2010) (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006)) ("The Supreme
Court recently stated that 'a party's challenge to . . the contract as a whole does not prevent a court
from enforcing a specific agreement to arbitrate. As a matter of substantive federal arbitration law,
an arbitration provision is severable from the remainder of the contract."').
206. See id.
207. Vassilkovska v Woodfield Nissan, Inc., 830 N.E.2d 619 (Ill. Ct. App. 2005) (Arbitration
agreement was separate from sales agreement and required separate consideration.).
208. Such rights as may be included in particular versions of these agreements are not
essential. Thus, a release may or may not include a covenant not to sue.
209. See Vassilkovska, 830 N.E.2d 619.
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Each of these agreements is a free-standing, non-rights agreement that
changes the legal relations between the parties. None of them is a "contract" as
classically defined,2 10 yet each is binding and contractual within the meaning of
the proposed reconceptualization.
Once recognized, agreements whose primary function is to create privileges,
powers, and immunities rather than rights appear in abundant profusion. For
211
example, privileges are created by such disparate agreements as licenses,
212
213
consents to battery,
or waivers to harm caused by negligence,
consents by
participants in contact sports;214 and consent to surgical procedures.215 In sales
of real and personal property, sellers' disclaimers of warranty create privileges in
sellers and extinguish potential rights in buyers. A warranty disclaimer creates
216
no duty to act and is impossible to breach.
Powers are created by contract options, 217 agency agreements, 218 and
mandatory arbitration agreements.219 Each of these kinds of agreement gives a
party (the optionee, the agent, the litigant) the power to alter the legal
relationship with the counterparty (the optionor, the principal, the other litigant)

210. Such rights as may be included in particular versions of these agreements are not
essential. Thus, a release may or may not include a covenant not to sue.
211. THEODORE M. HAGELIN, TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION LAW AND PRACTICE CASES AND
MATERIALS 6 (2011) ("A license is commonly defined as the permission to do something that

would be unlawful without the license.").
212. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 890-92(D) (AM. LAW INST. 1965); Arthur L.
Corbin, Terminology and Classification in FundamentalJural Relations, 4 AM. L. SCH. REV. 607,
611-12 (1923).
213. S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense v. Boeing Co., 641 F.2d 746 (9th Cir.
1981) (holding that a sales contract that provided "[Buyer] hereby waives . . any obligation or
liability of Boeing arising from tort" was sufficient to disclaim any liability for negligence under
California law).
214. Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516, 520 (10th Cir. 1979) (asserting that
consent does not extend to conduct prohibited by the rules of professional sport).
215. Although consent forms contain no promises by either party, they are nevertheless
sometimes referred to as "consent contracts." See JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR., RICHARD N.
PEARSON & DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, THE TORTS PROCESS 59-60 (8th ed. 2012). The court appeared

to apply to a consent form the parol evidence rule and the objective theory of interpretation in
Hoofnel v. Segal, 199 S.W.3d 147, 151 (Ky. 2006) (stating that written consent form superseded
prior oral limitations on consent given by patient). See also Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., 88
N.W.2d 186, 190 (Minn. 1958) (holding that consent did not extend to the procedure that the
surgeon actually performed); Kennedy v. Parrott, 90 S.E.2d 754, 759 (N.C. 1956) (deeming consent
to extend to procedures not expressly discussed).
216. See generally Harrison, supra note 139 ("[O]ne cannot really violate rules about
power.").
217. See WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 65, § 5:16 (explaining that option contracts give the
optionee the power to accept or reject the offer while binding them to do nothing).
218. See Randy Barnett, Squaring UndisclosedAgency Law with Contract Theory, 75 CALIF.
L. REV. 1969 (1987).
219. See Johnson v. Penn. Nat'l Ins. Cos., 594 A.2d 296, 299 (Pa. 1991) (citing Bayout v.
Bayout, 96 A.2d 876 (Pa. 1953)) (explaining that parties to a contract containing a mandatory
arbitration agreement have the power to enforce the mandatory arbitration agreement even against
third-party beneficiaries to the contract).
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by exercising a power (accepting the offer, acting on the principal's behalf,
220
arbitrating a claim).
Powers introduce a necessary element of discretion and
flexibility into commercial relationships that cannot be achieved by rights and
duties. 22
Perhaps the most useful power to a transactional lawyer negotiating a rights
contract is the express condition whose occurrence is under the control of the
222
other party.
To make one's own performance (e.g., to pay money) subject to
an express condition of the other party's performance can be a far more effective
incentive than imposing duty to perform.223 The counter-party has a power that
can be exercised only by fulfilling the condition, but it is a power that is
experienced more as a burden than a benefit. Again, Hohfeldian relations are not
224
defined in terms of the parties' interests but in terms of judicial effects.
225
Immunity agreements operate by extinguishing powers.
While they are
rarer than agreements creating privileges and powers, immunity agreements are
nevertheless common in commercialpractice and have the important task of risk
reduction during negotiation of a deal.226 For example, parties create immunities
when they sign letter agreements that stipulate that no commitment will be
binding until a final agreement is signed. They thereby disable themselves from
creating a contract by oral statements and simultaneously immunizing
themselves from potential liability. Parties to a written agreement frequently
include no-oral-modification clauses, which create immunities in both parties by
227
extinguishing the power of oral modification.
In each case, no duties are
created by these agreements, but they are contracts nevertheless because they are
deliberate changes to the parties' legal relationships.
III. THE FORMATION OF PRIVILEGES, POWERS, AND IMMUNITIES
A.

Verbal FormationofPrivileges, Powers, and Immunities

The formation of conventional contract rights and duties is regulated by the
rules and principles concerning manifestations of mutual assent.228 Those same

220. See Johnson, 594 A.2d 296, 299 (Pa. 1991) (citing Bayout v. Bayout, 96 A.2d 876 (Pa.
1953)); WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 65,

§ 5:16; Barnett, supra note

218.

221. See discussion infra Part IV.
222. See RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF CONTRACTS

§ 224

(AM.

LAW INST.

1981) ("A

condition is an event . . .which must occur . .. before performance under a contract becomes due.").
223. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 225

cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1981).

224. See Hohfeld, FundamentalLegal Conceptions II, supra note 35, at 724.
225. Immunity, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (defining "immunity" as "any
exemption from a duty, liability, or service of process").
226. See generally HOHFELD, supra note 148, at 60-64 (discussing immunities and implying
that they have an important role of risk reduction during negotiation).
227. See Wivell v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 773 F.3d 887, 894-95 (Ct. App. 2014) (affirming
that no-oral-modification clauses are enforceable and prevent parties from orally modifying written
contracts).
228. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 3, 17(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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rules and principles control the formation of privileges, powers, and
immunities.229 Thus, for example such an agreement can arise by offer and
acceptance or by negotiation followed by simultaneous agreement.230 But the
particular formation rules of privileges, powers, and immunities will diverge
231
from those applied to rights contracts.
The formalities appropriate to the formation of privileges, powers, and
232
immunities can be clarified by speech act theory.
A person has a Hohfeldian
legal power if she has the ability or capacity to create a new right, privilege,
233
power, or immunity by entering into an agreement or by giving her consent.
The action that exercises the power to create the new legal relationship is usually
234
a speech act.
Indeed, as an analytic matter, almost all private legal
relationships can be created only by appropriate speech acts uttered by
235
appropriate persons under the appropriate circumstances.
The speech act appropriate to the creation of a right/duty relation is a
236
A promise commits
promise by the person who is to undertake the legal duty.

229. See HOHFELD, supra note 148, at 11 (implying that contract law applied to rights,
privileges, powers, and immunities).
230. Peter M. Tiersma, The Language of Offer and Acceptance: Speech Acts and the Question
ofIntent, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 189, 191-93 (1986).
231. See id.
232. See id. at 231 (stating that the philosophy of language, in reference to the speech acts, is
helpful to analyze contractual formalities).
233. See Jonathan Yovel, What Is Contract Law "About"? Speech Act Theory and a Critique
of "Skeletal Promises," 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 937, 941 (2000) (defining Hohfeldian legal power as the
ability to "bring about a change in a person's array of rights, liberties, powers, subjections,
immunities, etc.").
234. George P. Fletcher, Law, in JOHN SEARLE 85 (Barry Smith ed., 2003) ("The law is a
system of verbal interactions. It is the arena of speech acts par excellence."). See generally JOHN R.
SEARLE, EXPRESSION AND MEANING: STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF SPEECH ACTS 20-27 (1979)
[hereinafter SEARLE, EXPRESSION AND MEANING] (describing the commitments that each form of

speech act involves: assertives (which commit the speaker to the truth of the expressed proposition);
directives (which are attempts by the speaker to get the hearer to do something); commissives
(which commit the speaker to some future course of action); expressives (which express a
psychological state of the speaker); and declaratives (which bring about or realize the state of affairs
expressed in the proposition)).
235. See Yovel, supra note 233, at 952 (discussing Searle's opinion that without distinct
performative speech acts no promise is made and therefore no legal relationship is created).
236. Hotchkiss v Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) ("A contract is an
obligation attached by the mere force of law to certain acts of the parties, usually words, which
ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent."). See also Yovel, supra note 233, at 938
(stating the law of contract does not regulate pre-legal behavior but consists of constitutive rules
specifying the legal consequences of promissory behavior).
Whether formation of a contract necessarily requires a promise and the creation of a
promissory moral obligation, or may instead be only the formal creation of a legal obligation, has
been the subject of debate. Compare Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and
Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708, 709 (2007) (arguing "the contents of the legal obligations and the
legal significance of their breach do not correspond to the moral obligations and the moral
significance of their breach"), with Michael G. Pratt, Contract: Not Promise, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
801, 801 (2008) (arguing that "the commissive speech act by means of which a contract is formed is
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237

the speaker to act in a certain way in the future.
The Restatement defines
contract as a promise that the law will enforce and defines promise as it is
understood in speech act theory as the manifestation of a commitment by the
238
promisor to act in the way promised.
It would be pointless to use a promissory speech act to create a privilege,
power, or immunity because none of these relationships requires either party to
act. The speech act appropriate to the creation of a privilege, power, or
immunity is an expression of assent by both parties that the new relationship
239
come into being.
In speech act theory, this expression has the illocutionary
force of a declaration, a speech act that "brings about changes in the world
through [its] utterance."24 0 Often, but not always, legal declarations incorporate
241
a performative verb that names the act being created by the utterance.
When a
242
contract offeree says, "I reject your offer," the offer is thereby rejected.
As a
declarative speech act, the utterance must manifest an intention both that the
legal relationship (the privilege, power, or immunity) exist and that the utterance
itself bring the relationship into existence.24 3
To illustrate these principles:

not the same speech act as that by means of which we voluntarily undertake moral obligations to
others"), and Jody S. Kraus, The Correspondence of Contract and Promise, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
1603, 1609 (2009) (arguing that "self-imposed responsibility is necessary to determine the
correspondence between contractual liability and promissory responsibility"). See also Sidney W.
DeLong, The New Requirement of Enforcement Reliance in Commercial Promissory Estoppel:
Section 90 as Catch-22, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 943, 953 (1997) (distinguishing reliance-inducing, nonbargain promises that are intended and understood to be legally enforceable from those that are not).
Thus, the language of actual contracts is rarely in the first person form ("I promise to . . .") but is
instead in the form of a directive to a third party ("Seller shall . . . ") or a declaration ("Seller will be
legally responsible for. . .").
237. See SEARLE, EXPRESSION AND MEANING, supra note 234, at 22.
238. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2(1) (Am. LAW. INST. 1981).
239. See SEARLE, EXPRESSION AND MEANING, supra note 234, at 16-17 (describing
declarations as a class of speech act where "one of its members brings about correspondence
between the propositional content and reality").
240. Id. at viii, 17 ("Declarations bring about some alteration in the status or condition of the
referred to object or objects solely in virtue of the fact that the declaration has been successfully
performed.").
241. Austin referred to declaratives as "performatives" of various kinds in his seminal work on
speech acts. J.L. AUSTIN, How To Do THINGS WITH WORDS 4-5 (Marina Sbisg & J. 0. Urmson
eds., 2d ed. 1975). Such utterances, under the correct circumstances, bring about the state that they
mention. Searle's term is broader, in part because it does not require the utterance to mention the
state that it brings about. Id.
242. Other common kinds of such legal declaratives include: "I hereby give notice"; "I object
to the question"; "Objection sustained"; "It is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed"; "I make and
declare this to be my last will and testament"; "I now pronounce you man and wife"; "This meeting
is adjourned"; "I second the motion." See, e.g., SEARLE, EXPRESSION AND MEANING, supra note

234, at 19, 26 (giving an example of a legal declarative from a judge).
243. See SEARLE, EXPRESSION AND MEANING, supra note 234, at 18 (arguing that linguistic
competency by both parties is not enough to be a declaration, there must also be an "extra-linguistic
institution and the speaker and hearer must occupy special places within this institution").
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1.

A creditor says to a debtor, "I hereby release you from any obligation to
pay me the debt you owe me." If legally effective, this declaration
extinguishes the debtor's duty to pay and creates a new privilege in the
debtor not to pay. The creditor may not unilaterally revoke the
privilege. If the creditor sues the debtor on the forgiven debt, a court
will render judgment for the debtor.
2. A seller says to a prospective buyer, "I hereby disclaim the warranty of
merchantability." If legally effective, this declaration creates both a
privilege and an immunity, protecting the seller from liability arising
from failure of the goods to conform to the statutory warranty of
244
merchantability.
If the buyer sues for breach of warranty, the court
will dismiss the claim.
3. A phone company says to a customer, "You may terminate this contract
at any time, without penalty, by giving us written notice of
termination."24 5 If legally effective, this declaration creates a power in
the customer to terminate the obligations of both parties to the contract.
If she exercises the power, a court will give the termination effect in any
246
future dispute between the parties.
One essential condition for the successful performance of a legal speech act
is that it be uttered under correct circumstances by the person who has the power
247
to create the new legal relationship.
Thus, the promise necessary to a contract
must be uttered by the promisor, not the promisee. But because privileges,
powers, and immunities have not been identified as being different from rights
contracts, the law is not at all well developed on the question of which party has
the power to create new privileges, powers, and immunities. Nevertheless, it
would appear that that the party who will be disadvantaged by the new legal
relationship must be the one to indicate his intention, or at least consent, that it
come about.248 Thus, for example, just as a rights-holder cannot create a duty in
someone else, a claim may be released only by a speech act of the claimant, not

244. See U.C.C. § 2-316 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1977). The disclaimer
creates a privilege because it extinguishes any duty the seller may have to sell the buyer
merchantable goods. The disclaimer also makes the seller immune to a future warranty obligation
by disabling the buyer from creating a right to merchantable goods by purchasing them.
245. This declarative speech act is expressed in the form appropriate to a factual assertion and
omits the adverb "hereby" that characterizes most legal declarations. See, e.g., SEARLE,
EXPRESSION AND MEANING, supra note 234, at 21.
246. It would be a mistake to characterize the customer's entitlement as a "right" to
termination, because that would imply that the phone company had a duty to act in some way.
Rather, the buyer has the ability to create a new legal relationship (termination) with the phone
company, i.e., a power.
247. See SEARLE, EXPRESSION AND MEANING, supra note 234; AUSTIN, supra note 241, at 8
(arguing that the uttering of the words is not the only thing necessary, but also the "circumstances in
which the words are uttered").
248. This distinguishes legally effective speech acts in private ordering from those performed
in public ordering. Speech acts that exercise sovereign power may create duties in non-speakers. See
generally Fletcher, supra note 234, at 85-10 1.
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the person who is under the obligation to be released. But while it seems natural
that a debtor has no power to release a creditor's claim against herself, there does
not seem to be a natural way to decide which party's assent is essential to create
a new power or immunity. Hohfeldian relationships are defined solely by
reference to their legal effects, and with reference to the interests of the parties to
the relationship.249 Thus, for example, some powers are advantageous to the
power holder and some are not. For example, a creditor typically has the power
to declare a debt to be in default (advantageous) and the power to inadvertently
waive its right to timely payment (disadvantageous).250 This prevents any
general rule about which party must assent to the creation of a new power.
B.

The Question of Consideration

The question of consideration has been central to the modem law of contract
at every stage of its development.2 5' If privileges, powers, and immunities are to
be recognized as contracts alongside rights, they too must either pass the
consideration test or else claim an exemption from it.
The question of consideration does not arise if the privilege, power, or
immunity is a term in a contract bundle for which the other party has paid a
consideration "price." Within the scope of a unified contract, courts do not
allocate bargained-for consideration to any particular promise or other contract
term.
The question of consideration arises only in the relatively rare
circumstances in which the agreement establishing the privilege, power, or
immunity is either a modification of a rights contract or is a free-standing
agreement, unrelated to a rights contract.
As has been frequently noted, under the approach of classical contract law, it
is presumed that no promise is legally enforceable unless a court has a good
252
reason for enforcement.
The grounds recognized in the Restatement are the
or consideration 253; the risk of an injustice
exchange
bargain
presence of a
resulting from the promisee's foreseeable and detrimental reliance on the
promise254 ; and the need to prevent unjust enrichment.255 With the obsolescence
of the seal, however, it is no longer either necessary or sufficient that the parties
mutually and formally manifest an intention that the promise be legally
256
enforceable.
Thus, the general rule is that a "naked promise" is unenforceable

249. See generally HOHFELD, supra note 148, at 5-7.
250. See Battista v. Savings Bank of Baltimore, 507 A.2d 203, 209 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986)
(Creditor unsuccessfully relied on a non-waiver letter to avoid waiver by acceptance of late
payments.).

251. See SIMPSON, supra note 12, at319.
252. ATIYAH, supra note 1, at 181-82.
253. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 17, 82-94 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).

254. Id. § 90.
255. Id. § 86.
256. Id. §21. See also Kennedy, supra note 103, at 108.
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absent consideration or a consideration substitute such as reliance or unjust
enrichment.257
The traditional rule that requires consideration for enforceability has been
justified on both efficiency and fairness grounds.258 The substantive basis for
requiring bargained-for consideration as a prerequisite to contract enforcement is
that it establishes that the promise was given in order to obtain the benefit of an
exchange, and thus that the exchange of promise-for-consideration is
259
(presumptively) surplus-creating.
In a voluntary, informed bargain, the
promisee must value the promised performance more highly than it values the
consideration and the promisor must value the consideration it receives more
highly than it values the cost of making and performing the promise. On these
assumptions, the transaction is allocatively efficient and utility-creating.
The judicial requirement of consideration in such cases also rests on a
fairness principle. By giving bargained-for consideration, a promisee buys the
performance from the promisor at a price they each agree upon. The promisor is
thus compensated fully for incurring the burden of performance.
But this judicial bias against enforcement is misplaced when the relationship
in question is not an obligation but a privilege, power, or immunity. While these
relationships have effects on the parties' interests, there is no general reason for
the law to take the position that a mutual agreement to enter such a relationship
is prima facie ineffective in the absence of some other reason or justification,
such as a bargain, estoppel, or unjust enrichment. Instead, the values of party
autonomy and economic efficiency each support a presumption in favor of
enforcement.
A purposeful application of the consideration doctrine to privileges, powers,
and immunities can be briefly compared to a similar application of the infancy
doctrine. By statute, in most states a contract entered into by a person under the
age of eighteen is voidable by that person until a reasonable time after she attains
her eighteenth birthday. 260 The power of avoidance applies to both executory
and fully-performed contracts, including cash sales of goods.261 The infancy rule
is said to protect immature people from bad deals resulting from their bad
262
judgment or from undue influence by conniving adults.
The "contracts" to
which the rule has been applied are not limited to rights contracts, but also

257. See SIMPSON, supra note 12, at 322 (stating that in contemporary thought a "naked
promise" lacked legal significance).
258. See id. at 323 (stating that "in the early history of consideration it must be appreciated
that what has come to be called pre-existing 'moral' obligation").
259. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 72 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1981). See
generally MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 1-8, 164 (1993).
260. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); FARNSWORTH,
supra note 65, § 4.4. See also Halbman v. Lemke, 298 N.W.2d 562, 564 (Wis. 1980).
261. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 65, § 4.4.
262. Id. § 4.3.
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include certain privileges, such as releases signed by minors
and, more
recently, agreements granting licenses to use intellectual property owned by
264
minors.
Whether all free-standing privileges, powers, and immunities are voidable
"contracts" under the infancy doctrine should turn, not on a conceptualist
definition of "contract," but on whether the purposes of the doctrine would be
served by extending it to such agreements. Courts have long applied the doctrine
to releases, for example, because they clearly affect interests of minor parties.
For agreements that are less-obviously one-sided, such as choice of law or
arbitration agreements, the infancy rule seems less necessary. However, if the
purpose of the rule lies in assumptions about mental capacity and autonomy
rather than advantage-taking, courts might decide not to bind minors to such
agreements.
Giving legal effect to agreements to enter into a binding legal relation is
265
justified on the basis of familiar considerations of autonomy and efficiency.
A
manifestation of agreement provides a sufficient reason for judicial recognition
because it is evidence of the utility to both of the parties of the legal effects that
they agree upon and of their intention that the relationship be irrevocable absent
266
mutual agreement.
Manifestation of agreement permits the assumption of
Pareto superiority by giving evidence that each party prefers the new relationship
267
to the old and believes that she will be made better off by giving it effect.
Express agreement by the parties who will be affected by a new privilege, power,

263. Del Bosco v. United States Ski Ass'n, 839 F. Supp. 1470, 1474 (D. Colo. 1993) (citing
Simmons v. Parkette Nat'l Gymnastic Training Ctr., 670 F. Supp. 140, 144 (E.D. Pa. 1987)) (stating
a minor may disaffirm even after receiving payment for the release).
264. A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Va. 2008) (Minors not permitted to
avoid user agreement with supplier of anti-plagiarism services because they could not return the
"benefits" of the contract.). An arbitration agreement is not so much a contract as it is a waiver of
the right to jury trial. Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 32 (1967) (showing that the Supreme Court
has held that children as young as 15 have the capacity to waive fundamental constitutional rights,
so that waiver of a state court right to jury trial in civil actions would a fortiori be within their
capacity).
265. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 11-14 (3d ed. 1986);
TREBILCOCK, supra note 259, at 7-8, 164-67 (1993) (quoting MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM
AND FREEDOM 13 (1962)) ("The possibility of coordination through voluntary cooperation rests on

the elementary yet frequently denied proposition that both parties to an economic transaction
benefit from it, provided the transaction is personally voluntary and informed."); Kennedy, supra
note 103, at 102-04.
266. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 72 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
("Bargains are widely believed to be beneficial to the community in the provision of opportunities
for freedom of individual action and exercise of judgment and as a means by which productive
energy and product are apportioned in the economy. The enforcement of bargains rests in part on
the common belief that enforcement enhances that utility."). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS §§ 88, 89 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
267. More precisely, each believes that she will be made better off by the overall exchange,
which includes the agreement in question. The same reasoning underlies the economic concept of
Pareto efficiency in exchange relations, which presumes a gain in utility for both parties and
underlies the theoretical justification for enforcement of contracts generally.
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or immunity provides a prima facie reason for its legal effectiveness just as
voluntary exchange does for the traditionally defined rights contract.
Consistent with this approach, the Restatement contains no general rule
requiring consideration or one of its substitutes for the creation of most
268
privileges, powers, and immunities.
Consideration is expressly required only
for releases, which are privilege contracts, and options, which are power and
immunity contracts.269 Aside from the Restatement, courts have occasionally
asserted the need for consideration in no-oral modification contracts (immunity
contracts);270 arbitration contracts (power contracts);271 and irrevocable licenses
272

(privilege contracts).
Courts will usually give effect to a non-bargain agreement to create a
privilege, power, or immunity that does not appear to burden either party
unequally or asymmetrically. Consideration is thus not required for choice of
273
law agreements.
The compensatory principle served by consideration the
notion that the party incurring the obligation must be paid for his assumption of a
duty-does not apply when neither party is incurring an obligation or other form
274
of burden by the new legal relationship, or when each is equally affected.
The
cautionary function of consideration also has no role to play when the risk
associated with the new relationship is insignificant.
The compensation principle resolves a question for non-rights contracts that
does not arise in the rights-contract context: which party must give consideration
to the other? The issue is identical to the question of which party's speech act is
necessary to create the new relationship. In the case of releases, courts have just
assumed that the releasee must give consideration to the releaser, because the
releaser is the one with the power to extinguish her claim and the one who must
275
be induced to do so.
In the case of options, courts have assumed that the

268. But see Charles L. Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Proliferation of
Promissory Estoppel, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 52, 52-54 (1981) (citing RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS
§§ 85-94 (AM. LAW INST. 1981)) (stating that informal contracts generally require mutual assent
and consideration).
269. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 87, 273 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
270. See Cloud Corp. v. Hasbro, 314 F.3d 289, 294 (7th Cir. 2002) (continuing to do business
after alleged modification constituted consideration therefore making modification enforceable).
271. See discussion infra Part IV.D. But see Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo, 66 F.3d 438,
453 (1994).
272. See Newman, supra note 36, at 1115-16 (analyzing licenses as a property interest rather
than a contract matter).
273. See generally David Horton, The Shadow Terms, 57 UCLA L. REV. 605, 629 (2010)
(stating that in the context of unilateral changes to contracts, some courts have permitted allowing a
party to add an arbitration provision through a change-of-terms clause).
274. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2), cmt. a-b (AM. LAW INST.
1971).
275. See generally Chaput v. Unisys Corp., 964 F.2d 1299, 1301 (2d Cir. 1992) ("A release is
not effective unless the party giving the release receives something of value to which the party was
not otherwise entitled."); Brown v. Ky. Lottery Corp., 891 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995)
(citing Cuppy v. Gen. Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 378 S.W.2d 629, 632 (Ky. 1964)) ("It
is well established that a release must be supported by valuable consideration."); RESTATEMENT
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optionor must be given consideration by the optionee, because the optionor is
thought to be the one with the power to make his own offer irrevocable and thus
276
must be the one who is induced to do so.
So in such cases, the fact that the
releaser or the optionor gave something to the other party to induce their assent
277
to the transaction would not justify enforcement.
The current law of contract recognizes some right/duty relationships that are
not unilaterally created yet do not require bargain or agreement.278 As described
above, under the theory of promissory estoppel, a duty of performance arises
279
when a promisee foreseeably relies on a non-bargain promise.
Under the
same equitable principles, a statement purporting to create a privilege, power, or
immunity may become legally effective and binding, i.e., irrevocable, if it
induces foreseeable reliance by the other party to the legal relationship. For
example, an obligee's statement extinguishing an obligor's duty (i.e., a release)
may be initially revocable in the absence of consideration, but may become
irrevocable if the obligor foreseeably relies on that statement.280 In such a case,
the obligor is not relying on performance of a promise but upon being freed from
the obligation. Similarly, under the common law, a contract offeror's statement
that purports to create an immunity with regard to the offeror's power to revoke
the offer (i.e., an option) would ordinarily not be binding in the absence of
consideration,281 but it may become
binding if necessary to prevent injustice if
28 2
the offeree relies on the offer.

OF CONTRACTS ch. 12, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 1981) ("Discharge of a duty
extinguishes the obligor's duty and terminates the obligee's correlative right and any claim based on
that right.").
276. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 25 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (stating
"[t]he requirement of consideration may be met in any of the ways permitted by the rules stated in
§§ 71-81: payment of money or some other performance by the offeree is effective, as is a promise
of such performance; one option may furnish consideration for another, and a single consideration
may support both a present contract and a future option").
277. See SIMPSON, supra note 12, at 322; PERCY H. WINFIELD, POLLOCK'S PRINCIPLES OF
CONTRACT 134-39 (13th ed. 1950).
(SECOND)

278. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 90

(AM. LAW INST. 1981).

279. See id. § 90 cmt. a (noting that section 90 is often referred to as "promissory estoppel"
even though that term is not used in any section of the Restatement).
280. See, e.g., S. Furniture Mfg. v. Mobile Cnty., 161 So.2d 805, 810 (Ala. 1963) (citing
Smith v. Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co., 215 F.2d 365, 367 (5th Cir. 1954); Messinger v. Twp. of
Wash., 137 A.2d 890, 893 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1958); Hamrick v. City of Albertville, 189 So. 545, 545
(Ala. 1939); Markiewicus v. Town of Methuen, 16 N.E.2d 32, 34 (Mass. 1938); Town of New
Decatur v. Scharfenberg, 41 So. 1025, 1027 (Ala. 1906); Forney v. Cnty. of Calhoun, 4 So. 153,
154 (Ala. 1888)) (stating that a release in absence of consideration may become enforceable through
releasee's reliance); Fried v. Fisher, 196 A. 39, 41-42 (Pa. 1938) (relying on lessor's oral promise
to release withdrawing partner from lease obligation estopped lessor from enforcement even absent
consideration); FARNSWORTH, supra note 65, § 4.23.
281. Dickinson v. Dodds, (1876) 2 Ch. Div. 463 at 466 (Eng.).
282. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 45

(AM. LAW INST. 1981) (relying on offer

of unilateral contract by beginning performance creates option); id. § 87(2) (relying on offer that
reasonably induces action or forbearance creates option). See generally Knapp, supra note 268
(stating that a promise may be enforceable absent consideration under section 90).
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Courts sometimes give effect to a party's declaration that creates a legal
relation to which the speaker is a party, even absent consideration or reliance by
283
2 84
the other party.
Common examples are waivers,
renunciations , and
285
exercises of powers by the giving of notice.
A unilateral declaration may
become a conventionalized way to exercise the power in question. In these
cases, even one-sided legal relations can be created without the need for
286
consideration, agreement, or reliance.
For example, in some cases unilateral
disclaimers may act as non-reliance agreements in order to immunize the speaker
287
during contract negotiations.
Unilateral declarations may have to comply with formal prerequisites to
enforceability. For example, a gratuitous assignment of contract rights is
irrevocable if it is in a writing signed by the assignor and delivered to the
assignee. 288 Under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, a merchant may
289
make an irrevocable offer in a signed writing.
Similarly, by complying with
the formalities of Article 2, a seller may make a unilateral disclaimer of implied
warranties that will prevent formation of warranty obligations in the ensuing
sale. 290

Absent a mutual expression of agreement, economic theory does not support
a presumption of Pareto improvement for such unilateral creations of legal
relations.291 The non-acting party, having expressed no choice in the matter,
may not be presumed to be made better off by the new relation. Whether
analyzed under the justificatory theory of autonomy or utility, a unilateral change
in legal relations does not enjoy a presumption of legal validity. 292 For this
reason, the privileges, powers, and immunities that can effectively be created by

283. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Bimco Iron & Metal Corp., 464 S.W.2d 353, 358 (Tex.
1971) (quoting Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 416 S.W.2d 396, 401 (Tex.
1967)) ("' [W]aiver is essentially unilateral in its character; it results as a legal consequence from
some act or conduct of the party against whom it operates; no act of the party in whose favor it is
made is necessary to complete it. It need not be founded upon a new agreement or be supported by
consideration, nor is it essential that it be based upon an estoppel."').
284. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 277 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
285. E.g., U.C.C. § 2-602 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1977) (stating that a party
achieves rejection by giving timely notice of rejection).
286. The line between agreement and unilateral declaration is admittedly unclear in many
cases. A declaration such as a disclaimer of warranty may appear as a term in a contract agreed to
by both parties, and may have an effect on the agreed-upon price. This does not mean that the
consideration or the agreement of the other party is essential to the efficacy of the declaration,
however. The test is whether it would be legally effective offered gratuitously and aside from other
elements of the exchange. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 332(5)

cmt. h (AM. LAW

INST. 1981).
287. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
288. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 332(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
289. U.C.C. § 2-205 (AM. LAW INST. & UNITF. LAW COMM'N 1977).
290. U.C.C. § 2-316 (AM. LAW INST. & UNITF. LAW COMM'N 1977).
291. See id.
292. See id. (stating that a disclaimer of implied warranties only is valid if it is "by a writing
and conspicuous").
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unilateral speech acts usually are understood to disadvantage only the speaker
and to be the sort to which the other party would never object.293 As to the
others, the efficacy of the declaration is a matter of policy.
In sum, American law has quietly developed a broad principle of private
ordering under which any two parties have the power to bind themselves to any
new privilege, power, or immunity merely by expressing an intention to have
that relationship. Absent problems with mutual assent, a court does not require a
good reason, like consideration or reliance, to give effect to their choice. It
requires a good reason not to.
IV. JUDICIAL MISCONCEPTIONS OF POWERS, PRIVILEGES, AND IMMUNITIES

Hohfeld complained that the courts of his time confused rights, privileges,
294
powers, and immunities.
They still do. Now, as then, this particular kind of
confusion does not necessarily mean that they decide cases differently from the
way they would if they had analyzed the parties' interests more precisely.
However, failure to recognize the differences among the fundamental Hohfeldian
relations can sometimes have unintended practical consequences.295 Courts that
confuse privileges, powers, and immunities with rights invariably
mischaracterize the speech acts the parties use to form them, interpreting
language as promissory or assertive rather than as declarative. This leads the
court to a confused analysis of the actual legal relationship, the nature of
"breach," and the appropriate remedy.
Four common judicial confusions about non-rights contracts concern
releases, non-reliance agreements, options, and arbitration agreements.296 Courts

293. An example of the latter is the unilateral creation of immunities, such as warranty
disclaimers and anti-contracts. These new relations favor the speaker by disabling her from binding
herself to duties owed to the hearer. They do not deprive the hearer of any existing legal interest,
however. See generally U.C.C. § 2-312 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1977) (stating that
a disclaimer of implied warranty of title can be expressly disclaimed under certain conditions. This
disclaimer, however, does not disclaim the legal interest that the buyer obtains under the contract.).
294. See Hohfeld, Fundamental Conceptions II, supra note 35, at 729 (stating that courts are
confused about lack of clear concepts and terminology); CORBIN, supra note 1, at 9 ("Treatises that
begin by equating 'contract' with 'promise,' often proceed inconsistently to discuss the case law
dealing with executed as well as executory transactions in connection with many legal problems
such as those caused by allegations of infancy, mental disability, fraud, duress and the like, as well
as the proper interpretation of instruments evidencing the transaction, the narrow definition not
deterring a more realistic vision of a larger universe.").
295. CORBIN, supra note 1, at 9 ("[B]oth Restatements of Contracts, while offering the
definition of contract as promise, contain chapters on the assignment and discharge of contract
rights. Clearly, assignments, a form of executed non-promissory transactions, are treated in the
Restatements and treatises entitled 'The Law of Contracts,' as are releases and other nonpromissory kinds of discharge. Here, again, the narrow definition does not deter realistic treatment
of the broader topic. Yet, an occasional court or scholar will take the definition too seriously. In so
doing, harm may result.").
296. See generally id.
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have treated each of these legal relationships as if it were a classical contract, an
obligation created by a promise, rather than as a privilege, power, or immunity.
A.

Releases: "IfIt's a Contract, It Must Require Consideration"

A release discharges or extinguishes a claim or right that the releasing party
297
298
has against the releasee.
The right may be primary or remedial.
It may
arise from contract or non-contract law.299 If a release is binding and legally
effective, the releasing party permanently loses the ability to enforce the claim or
right.3 00
In Hohfeldian terms, a release is thus the opposite of a conventional rights
contract because it extinguishes rather than creates an obligation.30'
It
simultaneously creates a no-right/privilege relationship with respect to the
released obligation. The speech act appropriate to a release differs from that
which is appropriate to a contract. The language appropriate to a release is not
the language of promise or commitment but of forgiveness or abandonment, and
is declarative rather than commissive.302
As a procedural matter, a release cannot ground a claim for relief. A release
is instead the basis of an affirmative defense to an action on the claim that was
303
released.
Unlike a rights contract, a release cannot be "breached" by either the
releasing or the released party because it creates no duty to act.
Despite the fact that a release is the very opposite of a contract, courts have
,304
consistently characterized releases as "contracts,"
and on this basis have often,
but not always, imposed a requirement that they be supported by

297. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 284(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1979) ("A release is
a writing providing that a duty owed to the maker of the release is discharged immediately or on the
occurrence of a condition."). See also id. § 284 cmt. a (distinguishing a release from a promise to
release, which of course can be a contract).
298. Notes, in 7 IOWA L. BULLETIN 163, 172 (1921-22).
299. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 12, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
("Discharge of a duty extinguishes the obligor's duty and terminates the obligee's correlative right
and any claim based on that right.").
300. Id.
301. See id.
302. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 166, at 153 (stating that like discharges, covenants not to
sue are in fact a relinquishment as opposed to a commitment).
303. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1).
304. Lomas & Nettleton Co. v. Tiger Enters., Inc., 585 P.2d 949, 952 (Idaho 1978) (quoting
Holve v. Draper, 505 P.2d 1265, 1267 (Idaho 1973)) (citing Little Rock Packing Co. v. Mass.
Bonding & Ins., 262 F.2d 327, 329 (8th Cir. 1959); Sears, Sucsy Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 392 F.
Supp. 398, 405 (N.D.Ill. 1974); Westfall v. Motors Ins. Co., 374 P.2d 96, 98 (Mont. 1962); 15 S.
WILLISTON, LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1820 (Walter Jaeger ed., 3d ed. 1972)) ("A release is a type of
contract in which one party makes a 'complete abandonment of [a] cause of action.')); Brown v.
Ky. Lottery Corp., 891 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995) ("It is well established that a release
must be supported by valuable consideration.") (citing Cuppy v. Gen. Accident Fire & Life
Assurance Corp., 378 S.W.2d 629, 632 (Ky. 1964)).
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consideration.-305
Judicial decisions never rationalize the consideration
306
requirement for a release beyond noting that contracts require consideration.
In discussing the requirement that discharge of a contractual duty requires
consideration, the Restatement comments:
[A]lthough the discharge is an immediate change in the legal
relations between the obligor and the obligee and involves no promise
by the obligee, it is not effective unless it is supported by consideration
or some substitute for consideration.3 07
But the consideration requirement is not applied to all releases of contractual
duty. A party to an executory contract may release a counter-party's duty of
301
contract performance without consideration.
And one may, without
consideration, release a claim by destroying a legal instrument such as a
promissory note.309 Although some state statutes require consideration for a
release discharging a claim for relief,310 others have abolished the requirement
by statute. 3 1
If releases are not rights contracts, then why has contractual consideration
312
been required for their efficacy? The first reason is formal.
Originally, a

305. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 273 ch. 12, topic 1, intro. note (AM. LAW
INST. 1981) ("[A] discharge was not effective unless supported by consideration or one of its

&

substitutes."). See Maynard v. Durham & S. Ry. Co., 365 U.S. 160, 161-63 (1961) (Release of
employee's FELA claim for injury requires consideration); Chaput v. Unisys Corp., 964 F.2d 1299,
1301 (2d Cir. 1992) ("A release is not effective unless the party giving the release receives
something of value to which the party was not otherwise entitled."); Sloan v. Burrows, 258 N.E.2d
303, 305 (Mass. 1970) (citing Swartz v. Lieberman, 80 N.E.2d 5, 6 (Mass. 1948)) (stating that
performance of an existing duty is not consideration for a new promise); Golf Shaft & Block Co. v.
O'Keefe, 139 S.W.2d 691, 693 (Ark. 1940) (stating that a release requires consideration because it is
a contract); Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. Fairchild, 91 N.E. 836 (Ind. App. 1911) (citing American Car Co. v.
Smock, 91 N.E. 749, 751 (Ind. App. 1910)) (stating that an employer who did not provide agreedupon consideration for employee's release could not plead the release in defense of claim).
306. See generally Brown v. Ky. Lottery Corp., 891 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995) (citing
(citing Cuppy v. Gen. Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 378 S.W.2d 629, 632 (Ky. 1964)) ("It
is well established that a release must be supported by valuable consideration."); Golf Shaft
Block Co. v. O'Keefe, 139 S.W.2d 691, 693 (Ark. 1940) (stating that a release requires
consideration because it is a contract).
307. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 278 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
308. Id. § 275 (discharging a duty without consideration only if the releaser has not fully
performed).
309. Id. § 274.
310. CORBIN, supra note 1, at 9.
311. E.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-109 (2010); Melvin v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 151 So. 2d 238,
239 (Ala. 1963) (stating that a release in writing does not require consideration).
312. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 273 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1981) ("For
centuries the seal was used to make a discharge of a duty effective, and in a few states the
legislation that has generally deprived the seal of its effect makes an exception for executed
transactions such as releases."); Lon L. Fuller, Considerationand Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799,
799-802 (1941).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol67/iss1/6

40

DeLong: What Is a Contract
2015]

WHAT IS A CONTRACT?

139

release required a seal, but the abolition of the seal in most American
jurisdictions left the court with no formal marker to satisfy the evidentiary,
cautionary, and channeling functions performed by the seal and, according to
Lon Fuller, undertaken by the requirement of consideration.3 13
The second reason for courts to require consideration for a valid release is
grounded in a general principle of fairness and compensation.3 14 When a change
in legal relations appears to benefit one party and burden the other, the latter
must be compensated by the former.315 In forming a rights contract, the burden
316
is the undertaking of an obligation requiring the obligor to be compensated.
In
a privilege contract such as a release, the burden is the releasing party's loss of a
valuable right to receive a performance or a payment.3 17 The releasing party's
voluntary acceptance of consideration implies that he was fairly compensated for
the loss of his claim and that his consent was knowing and intentional. 3 18
Perhaps because it has never acknowledged contractual discharge as the
creation of a contractual obligation, the Uniform Commercial Code dispenses
with the fiction that a discharge is a contract and thus permits parties to a sales
contract to extinguish executory duties by an agreement of modification without
consideration. 319 The parties' mutual consent to the creation of a privilege is
sufficient to warrant judicial recognition.320 The ubiquitous and immutable
requirements of good faith321 and the principle of unconscionability322 limit

abuse of the discharge power.

323

313. Fuller, supra note 317, at 806-07.
314. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 273 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (applying the
traditional requirement of consideration).
315. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 273 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(analogizing the consideration requirement for an irrevocable assignment of rights).
316. See STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 154 (2004).
317. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 284.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (describing
that "[a] duty owed to the maker of the release is discharged").
318. See B.D. Click Co. v. U.S., 614 F.2d 748, 754 (1980) (barring recovery where the
plaintiff unquestioning signed a release and accepted payment.
319. U.C.C. § 2-209(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1977).
320. See Consarc Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 996 F.2d 568, 570 (2d Cir. 1993)
(stating that mutual assent "is sufficient to create a binding contract").
321. U.C.C. § 1-304(b).
322. Id. § 2-302.
323. Of course, whether or not the discharging party is compensated, the agreement must
satisfy the contractual standards relating to assent. The law of releases has long adopted the rules of
contract law that relate to the validity and interpretation of the parties' agreement, including not
only the consideration doctrine but also the parol evidence rule. Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Wickham, 141
U.S. 564, 580 (1891) (citing 1 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 284,
304 (1899)); Bell BCI Co. v U.S., 570 F.3d 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing McAbee Constr.,
Inc. v. U.S., 97 F.3d 1431, 1434 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); Convey Compliance Sys. v. 1099 Pro, Inc., 443
F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing Jeffries v. Gillitzer, 225 N.W.2d 17, 19 (Minn. 1975);
Couillard v. Charles T. Miller Hosp. Inc., 92 N.W.2d 96, 102 (Minn. 1958); Larson v. Sventek, 1
N.W.2d 608, 610 (Minn. 1942)) (permitting parol evidence on question of intent as to scope of
release); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 284, cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (explaining
that "[t]he rules of interpretation that apply to contracts generally apply also to writings that purport
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Thus, the common law's consideration requirement for releases appears to
be the product of a misconception of the fundamental legal relationship created
by a release and its essential difference from a rights contract. A reconception of
contract as suggested here is the first step toward rationalizing that requirement.
B. Non-Reliance Agreements: "IfIt's a Disclaimer, It Must Be a Promise"

'

A non-reliance agreement stipulates that a party to a potential or actual
contract is not acting in reliance on representations or promises that are not
formal contract terms.324 Non-reliance agreements may occur before a contract
is concluded in order to prevent reliance-based claims from arising during
negotiations.325 A typical non-reliance agreement arises in the course of a
commercial negotiation, such as that between a buyer and seller of business
326
assets.
The agreement states that a buyer has not relied and will not rely on
any oral promise or statement of material fact made by the seller other than those
contained in a final, executed memorandum of the contract.327 A non-reliance
agreement is intended to prevent claims of promissory estoppel or actionable
misrepresentation from arising out of promises or statements made during the
328
negotiation phase of a contract.
Such reliance might otherwise have been
effective to make the promise enforceable or the factual statement actionable,
creating a rights contract or liability to a reliance-based remedy.329 The utility of
a non-reliance agreement is that it reduces the risks of premature commitment or
misunderstanding associated with informal negotiation. 330
If the non-reliance agreement has the effect sought, then it is not a contract
within either the Restatement definition (an enforceable promise) or the Uniform
Commercial Code definition (an obligation). Instead of creating a right/duty
relationship, the non-reliance agreement creates a privilege and an immunity
relating to statements the parties may make during the negotiation.3 3

to be releases"); Bell BCI Co., 570 F.3d at 1341 ("Because a release is contractual in nature, it is
interpreted in the same manner as any other contract term or provision."); Seals v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 546 F.3d 766, 771 (6th Cir. 2008) (applying Ohio law and the equitable doctrines of mistake
and unconscionability).
324. W. Ashley Hess & Alexander L. Ewing, Thou Shalt Not Lie: Enforcement of Nonreliance Clauses Under Kentucky Law, 35 N. KY. L. REV. 157, 157 (2008).
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 159.
328. DeLong, supra note 179, at 25; Blair, supra note 68, at 425 n.5. See also Hess & Ewing,
supra note 324, at 157-78.
329. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90.1 (AM. LAW. INST. 1981).
330. DeLong, supra note 179, at 31.
331. DeLong, supra note 236, at 1009.
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Courts have not required consideration for pre-contractual non-reliance
332
Indeed the issue seems never to have arisen. It is not clear which
agreements.
party should pay consideration to the other. Rather, the parties' mutual
agreement is sufficient "consideration" to justify enforcement. In this more
ancient sense, mutual agreement is sufficient "consideration" to justify judicial
recognition.
Non-reliance agreements may also be contained in the final integration of
the parties' contract.333 There they are intended to prevent future claims from
arising from representations or promises that the parties have not formalized in
the written agreement.334
Judicial attempts to apply the conventional conception of contract to nonreliance agreements have produced considerable confusion.335 Some courts
believe they must construe non-reliance agreements as obligations in order to
give them legal effect. 336 These courts have been driven by doctrinal consistency

to recharacterize non-reliance agreements as promises rather than declarations.337
A typical example occurs in the opinion in ABRY Partners VL.P. v. F&W
Acquisition.338
A corporate acquisition agreement contained a standard
statement by the buyer that the seller had made no representations about its
financial condition, and that buyer was not relying on any financial information,
other than that set forth in the written agreement.33 9 When the buyer later
brought an action based, in part, on negligent misrepresentations by the seller but

332. See, e.g., W.R. Grace & Co. v. Taco Tico Acquisition Corp., 454 S.E.2d 789, 791 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1995) (enforcing a pre-contractual non-reliance disclaimer in a nonbinding letter of intent,
even though there is no mention of any supporting consideration).
333. E.g., ABRY Partners V.L.P. v. F&W Acquisition, LLC, 891 A.2d 1032, 1041 (Del. Ch.
2006) (concerning a non-reliance clause contained in the final, written version of the "Stock
Purchase Agreement").
334. DeLong, supra note 179, at 31; Hess & Ewing, supra note 324, at 157-78.
335. See ABRY, 891 A.2d at 1059-60 (applying contract law to the analysis of the
enforceability of a non-reliance clause) (citations omitted).
336. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1.2 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (discussing
the common believe "a contract cannot exist . . .unless there is also a legal obligation").
337. See ABRY Partners V.L.P., 891 A.2d 1032 passim (referring to the Buyer's non-reliance
disclaimer within the contract as a promise).
338. See id. (classifying the non-reliance agreement as a promise).
339. The language of the disclaimer was as follows:
Acquiror acknowledges and agrees that neither the Company nor the Selling Stockholder
has made any representation or warranty, expressed or implied, as to the Company or any
Company Subsidiary or as to the accuracy or completeness of any information regarding
the Company or any Company Subsidiary furnished or made available to Acquiror and its
representatives, except as expressly set forth in this Agreement . . and neither the
Company nor the Selling Stockholder shall have or be subject to any liability to Acquiror
or any other Person resulting from the distribution to Acquiror, or Acquiror's use of or
reliance on, any such information or any information, documents or material made
available to Acquiror in any 'data rooms,' 'virtual data rooms,' management
presentations or in any other form in expectation of, or in connection with, the
transactions contemplated hereby.
Id. at 1041.
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not found in the document, the court (correctly) rejected the claim.340 In order to
give effect to the buyer's disclaimer, however, the court characterized the
buyer's statement that it had not relied on the seller's non-contractual
misrepresentations both as a (broken) promise not to rely on such information 341
and as a (false) representation that the seller had not disclosed any such
information and the buyer had not actually relied on it.342

In purpose and legal effect, however, the quoted statement of non-reliance
was neither; it was a waiver by the buyer of any potential claims arising from
such information. Such a waiver is not a factual assertion that the seller's
representations were not made or that they were not relied upon; nor does such a
waiver amount to a promise not to rely on such information in the future.343 A
waiver need not be either truthful or sincere in order to be effective. A waiver is
a declarative speech act, a performative act that changes a legal relationship.344
A waiver simply extinguishes in advance any rights or remedial claims the buyer
would otherwise have had based on its reliance on false information outside the
document.34 5 The quoted contract clause thus creates both a privilege and
346
immunity in the seller,
blocking any action based on the alleged

340. See id. at 1065 (refusing to grant the Buyer its desired relief).
341. Id. at 1055-58 (repeatedly characterizing the language of the disclaimer as a promise).
See, e.g., id. at 1034 ("By its plain and unambiguous terms, the Stock Purchase Agreement stated
the Buyer's promise that it was not relying upon representations and warranties not contained within
the Agreement's four corners and that no such extra-contractual representations had been made.");
id. at 1041 ("By its plain terms, the Buyer promised that neither the Company nor the Seller had
made any representation or warranty as to the accuracy of any information about the Company
except as set forth in the Agreement itself The Buyer further promised that neither the Seller nor
the Company would have any liability to the Buyer or any other person for any extra-contractual
information made available to the Buyer in connection with the contemplated sale of the
Company."); id. at 1043 ("[T]he Buyer promised that it was only relying on representations and
warranties expressly set forth in the Agreement and expressly disclaimed reliance on any other
extra-contractual information .... ").
342. Id. at 1058 ("For the plaintiff in such a situation to prove its fraudulent inducement claim,
it proves itself not only a liar, but a liar in the most inexcusable of commercial circumstances: in a
freely negotiated written contract. Put colloquially, this is necessarily a 'Double Liar' scenario. To
allow the buyer to prevail on its claim is to sanction its own fraudulent conduct."). See also id. at
1064, n.85 (mentioning again a 'residual double liar problem' that exists where the Buyer's decision
to renege on a promise not to sue regardless if the Seller lied to it suggests that the Buyer was lying
itself in making the original promise).
343. The promissory interpretation of the agreement creates an odd sort of obligation and an
odd sort right in the other party ("How could you have believed me? You promised you wouldn't
rely!").
344. Fletcher, supra note 234, at 85 (Declarative speech acts do not have what Searle describes
as "sincerity conditions," meaning that they do not depend on the speaker's state of mind).
345. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 84(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
346. The extinction of remedial claims is confirmed by the language of the clause in question:
"neither the Company nor the Selling Stockholder shall have or be subject to any liability to
Acquiror or any other Person resulting from the distribution to Acquiror." ABRY Partners V.L.P.,
891 A.2d at 1041. This privilege is limited, as the court in ABRY Partners V.L.P. noted: the
prohibition against fraud is immutable in most courts so that a waiver would not privilege the
counter-party to make knowingly false statements with intent to induce reliance. Id. at 1060;
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misrepresentations of financial information by extinguishing the duty upon
which the action would be based or the remedy for its violation.347
But why was the non-reliance clause in the form of a statement of fact
("Buyer has not relied") rather than in the form of a waiver ("Buyer hereby
waives")? It is common for parties to seek to effect a waiver by making a
statement of fact that negates reliance one of the elements of the waived claim. 348
Perhaps the fear is that if language of waiver is used, it could be invalidated on
grounds that it was induced by the misrepresentations waived, whereas a
statement of non-reliance blocks such a claim. But any language in a contract is
equally vulnerable to a claim of fraudulent inducement.
In all likelihood, the ABRY court misconstrued the buyer's contractual
speech acts as promises or factual representations in order to fit them within the
doctrinal matrices of rights contract and tort law. But the implications of such a
misconstrual are not only unnecessary but, if taken seriously, would have
unintended doctrinal consequences. Putting aside the problem that a "promise"
not to rely is an odd sort of promise,349 in order for the buyer's "promise" of
non-reliance to create a conventional (rights) contract, it must be supported by
the seller's consideration or reliance. But non-reliance clauses often appear in
non-binding, pre-contractual letters of intent, and may not be supported by any
consideration from the potential seller.350 The seller would also have to prove a
"breach" of the promise not to rely and damages flowing from the breach. But
the seller is not damaged by the buyer's reliance. No such anomalies arise if the
statement is treated only as a waiver.
Even more inapt is the frequent judicial mischaracterization of a repudiated
non-reliance clause as a "lie." 351 For a misrepresentation to create a remedial
entitlement, it must not only be proven false; it must have induced justifiable

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§

195.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) ("A term exempting a

party from tort liability for harm caused intentionally or recklessly is unenforceable on grounds of
public policy."); Sabo v. Delman, 143 N.E.2d 906, 909 (N.Y. 1957).
347. ABRY Partners V.L.P., 891 A.2d at 1064 (holding for public policy reasons that the
waiver would not bar claims of actual fraud).
348. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 537

(AM. LAW INST. 1977) (stating that reliance

on the misrepresentation must exist for a recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation to recover his
loss).
349. Reliance on a representation involves believing it to be true and behaving as if it were
true. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 537 (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (stating an individual
must "rel[y] upon the misrepresentation in acting or refraining from acting").
350. An example of this is in W.R. Grace & Co. v. Taco Tico Acquisition Corp., where a "nonbinding letter of intent" specifically disclaimed reliance on future representations concerning the
ultimate completion of the transaction. 454 S.E.2d 789 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995). The court held that the
disclaimer was enforceable, though a requirement of consideration was never discussed. Id. at 791.
351. See Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 157 N.E.2d 597, 600 (N.Y. 1959) (characterizing
buyer in such a case as deliberately misrepresenting its intention to the seller). See also Rissman v.
Rissman, 13 F.3d 381, 383 (7th Cir. 2000) ("Securities law does not permit a party to a stock
transaction to disavow such representations-to say, in effect, 'I lied when I told you I wasn't
relying on your prior statements' and then to seek damages for their contents.").
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352

reliance.
But a seller may not be able to prove that it actually and justifiably
believed the truth of the statement that it had furnished no information to the
buyer or that the buyer had not relied. Sellers may insert such disclaimers
precisely because they know that buyers have reviewed such information.
Because the legal efficacy of a waiver requires neither consideration nor
reliance, the court's misconstruals of the buyer's statements actually imposed a
greater burden on the seller than a more accurate description would have done.
If non-reliance clauses were reconceived as not rights contracts or
representations of fact, but as declarations with the function of waivers and
disclaimers, immunizing the counterparties from certain kinds of liability, then
courts would give them their intended effects without trammeling them with
ethical and legal trappings of promises and lies.
C.

Options: "Iflt Requires Consideration,It Must Be a Contract"

Hamlet: Do you see yonder cloud that's almost in the shape of a camel?
Polonius:By th' mass, and 'tis like a camel, indeed.
Hamlet: Methinks it is like a weasel.
Polonius:It is backt like a weasel.
Hamlet: Or like a whale?
Polonius: Very like a whale.353
Nowhere have courts and commentators struggled more with the traditional
conception of "contract" than in their treatment of firm offers, or "options." In
its simplest form, an option is an irrevocable offer, giving the offeree a power of
acceptance that the offeror has no power to revoke.354 But courts and eminent
contract authorities have persistently described an option as they would a
355
Shakespearean cloud, appearing now in the shape of an irrevocable offer, now

352. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 537 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
353. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET PRINCE OF DENMARK act 3, sc. 2.

354. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 42 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (explaining
general revocability of offers); Dickinson v. Dodds, (1876) 2 Ch. Div. 463 at 466 (Eng.) (holding
that offeror clearly revoked option and offeree could not accept). See generally CORBIN, supra note
1, § 11.1 (introducing option contracts and explaining offers are irrevocable).
355. See Dowling Family P'ship v. Midland Farms, 865 N.W.2d 854, 861 (2015) (quoting
Advanced Recycling Sys., LLC v. Se. Props. Ltd. P'ship, 787 N.W.2d 778, 783 (2010)) (explaining
that an option is an irrevocable offer).
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in the shape of contract not to revoke a revocable offer,
and now in the shape
of a contract to render the offered performance subject to a condition of the
offeree's expression of acceptance.357 This confusion springs from an inability
to conceive and adopt a straightforward, Hohfeldian description of the legal
relations that are created by an option.
The nineteenth-century view of option contracts was that they were offers
coupled with contractual promises by the offeror not to revoke the offer.358
Langdell argued that a promise not to revoke a revocable offer, if enforceable,
gives the optionor a duty not to revoke the offer and gives the optionee a right
that it not be revoked. 359 Because the option was conceived as a promise not to
revoke, it was enforceable only if given in return for consideration or was in the
form of a sealed covenant.360 Regardless of an option's enforceability, however,
Langdell believed that the optionor retained the power to revoke even if its
exercise would breach a contractual duty.361 Breach by revoking the offer
362
entitled the optionee to damages or other remedies,
but would be legally
effective as an exercise of the power of revocation, which Langdell apparently
believed to be inextinguishable.
Hohfeld flatly rejected Langdell's analysis. An optionee does not have a
right but a power coupled with an immunity: a power of acceptance with an
363
immunity from revocation by the optionor.
The optionor does not have a duty

356. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Principlesof Consideration, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 640,
653 (1982) (discussing firm offer as one with offer and promise to keep offer open); C.C.
LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 178 (Little, Brown, and Co., 2d ed. 1880).
357. See CORBIN, supra note 1, § 11.1 (stating that optionor's duty of performance is subject
to condition of optionee's acceptance).
358. See Eisenberg, supra note 356 ("A firm offer is a legal molecule consisting of two atoms:
an offer, and a promise to hold the offer open for a fixed or reasonable time.").
359. See LANGDELL, supra note 356, at 241 (stating that the offeree will have a claim for
damages if offeror revokes the offer).
360. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (explaining
offer binding as option contract if consideration given); Dickinson v. Dodds, (1876) 2 Ch. Div. 463
at 466 (Eng.) (noting that no consideration given to keep offer open and thus unenforceable).
361. This he deduced from the necessity of a meeting of the minds as a formal requirement for
contract formation. See LANGDELL, supra note 356, §§ 180, 244 (explaining that meeting of the
minds required to make a contract). Langdell's position is often cited as the essence of legal
conceptualism: "An offer is merely one of the elements of a contact; and it is indispensable to the
making of a contract that the wills of the contracting parties do, in legal contemplation, concur at
the moment of making it. An offer, therefore, which the party making it has no power to revoke, is a
legal impossibility." Id. § 241; I. Maurice Wormser, The True Conception of UnilateralContracts,
26 YALE L.J. 136, 137 (1917) (stating that an offeror is within his rights in withdrawing an offer
before acceptance).
362. See LANGDELL, supra note 356, § 178, 241 ("The only effect . . is to give the offeree a
claim for damages if the stipulation be broken by revoking the offer."). As a practical matter, the
breach of the promise not to revoke usually produces the same harm and warrants the same damages
remedy as repudiation of the underlying agreement after formation.
363. See HOHFELD, supra note 226, at 51 (An enforceable option creates "in the optionee an
irrevocable power to create, at any time within the period specified, a bilateral obligation as between

Published by Scholar Commons, 2015

47

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 6
146

[VOL. 67: 99

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
364

An attempted
not to revoke; instead, he lacks the legal capacity to revoke.
this
immunity is
revocation by an optionor is not a wrong but a nullity. Indeed,
more valuable to the optionee than a mere right would be because it cannot be
breached. The option offer remains legally open and a "post-revocation"
acceptance by the optionee creates a contract. The attempted revocation, having
no effect on the parties' legal relations, does not give rise to a remedy any more
365
than an attempted, post-acceptance revocation of an offer.
Corbin initially endorsed Hohfeld's analysis:
An option under seal or for consideration might be (and often has
been) regarded as creating a duty in A not to change his mind or not to
notify B of such a change, but it should be far better regarded as creating
a power in B to be exercised by acceptance and a disability in A to
extinguish that power. Thus the purpose of a promise may be the
creation of a disability instead of a duty.366
But a promise does not create a disability. A disability is not a commitment;
a disability is created instead by the speech act of declaring that the speaker is
367
disabled, and correlatively that the other party is immune from the revocation.
What may have led Corbin to a different view is that an optionor does
undertake a new duty to the optionee, not the duty of performing the offered
contract but the duty not to repudiate the underlying contract or to disable
himself from performing if the option should be exercised. Hohfeld's analysis
does not address this duty.368 But the existence of this duty does not affect the
initial analysis of either scholar.
Corbin later posited that the optionor had undertaken a duty to perform the
369
exchange described in the offer itself, e.g., to sell property to the optionee.
Because he conceded that the optionor would not be required to perform unless

himself and the giver of the option. Correlatively to that power, there would, of course, be a
liability against the option-giver which he himself would have no power to extinguish.").
364. Hohfeld referred to this incapacity as a "disability." See discussionsupra Part II.A.
365. An attempted revocation may be a form of anticipatory repudiation of the offered
contract. See Cook, supra note 113, at 41 n. 18 (explaining that an option is irrevocable and an
attempt to revoke could be actionable because it is analogous to anticipatory breach).
366. Corbin, supra note 182, at 745 n.13 (citations omitted). See Corbin, supra note 21, at
185-89 (rejecting Langdell's view and arguing that whether an offeror retains the power to revoke
is a matter of positive law to be determined by policy and convenience).
367. See SEARLE, EXPRESSION AND MEANING, supra note 234, at 22 (discussing promises as
examples of making commitments). See generally discussion supra Part II.A (explaining that
immunities are the correlates of disabilities and that disabilities are the absence of a power or
liability, and thus are not commitments to act).
368. See generally HOHFELD, supra note 226. Seeing the option as an immunity is not
inconsistent with seeing it as creating an implied duty not to revoke or repudiate. But it is not
essential to the existence of an irrevocable offer.
369. See CORBIN, supra note 1, § 11.8, 518 (illustrating that offeror has duty to perform if
condition precedent is met).
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the option was exercised, he described the optionor's duty as a unilateral contract
whose performance was subject to a condition precedent, i.e., the act of
acceptance or exercise by the optionee.370
Corbin understood that his description was at least partially inaccurate,
contending that the conditional contract described the parties' legal relationship,
but only from the point of view of the Seller/Optionor.37 1 The problem with
viewing the optionor as bound to a conditional contract is that it implies that the
optionee is likewise conditionally bound, which of course it is not. Corbin
372
recognized this.
The Restatement, bearing the marks of a latter-day Polonius, appears to have
adopted all three conceptions of an option. Langdell's theory of the collateral
promise not to revoke is preserved in its definition of option contract: "a promise
which meets the requirements for the formation of a contract and limits the
promisor's power to revoke an offer." 373 In both legal theory and speech act
theory the word "promise" refers to a commitment to act.374 It is not a limitation
on a power to revoke an offer. If an option were a contract as defined by the
Restatement, then it would be an enforceable promise not to revoke an offer.375
Hohfeld's immunity analysis, however, leads the Restatement to say that the
promise not to revoke is "enforceable" only in that it "limits" the offeror's
"power" to revoke: 376 "A revocation by the offeror is not of itself effective, and
the offer is properly referred to as an irrevocable offer." 377 The optionor's
speech act is thus not a promise after all but a waiver creating an incapacity to
revoke and a corresponding immunity on behalf of the optionee.
Finally, as if to complete an ecumenical embrace of all three views, the
Restatement adopts Corbin's dual view of the option as a conditional contract:
"An option contract binds the offeror and gives rise to a duty of performance

370. See id. at 517 (stating that in an option contract, acceptance is a condition precedent to
offeror's duty of performance).
371. See generally id. § 11.8 (providing general discussion of option contracts from point of
view of seller/optionor).
372. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS

§ 37,

cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981) ("The

offeree under an option contract can choose not to undertake any contractual duties at all.").
373. See id. § 25. This usage is anomalous: a promise is a commitment to act or refrain from
acting. A promise cannot limit a power as, e.g., a waiver can.
374. See id. ("A promise is a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a
specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has been
made."); SEARLE, EXPRESSION AND MEANING, supra note 234, 22 (discussing promises as
examples of making commitments).
375. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) ("A contract is
a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of
which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.").
376. See id. § 25, cmt. d ("The principal legal consequence of an option contract is that stated
in this Section: it limits the promisor's power to revoke an offer. The termination of the offeree's
power of acceptance is subject to the requirements for discharge of a contractual duty. A revocation
by the offeror is not of itself effective, and the offer is properly referred to as an irrevocable offer.")
(citation omitted) (emphasis added).
377. Id.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2015

49

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 6
148

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 67: 99

conditional on the offeree's acceptance exercising the option."37 8 If this is to be
believed, then the optionor is after all bound to a "contract" in the traditional
sense of a binding duty to perform the offered exchange.
This conditional contract usage is misleading on two grounds. First, it seems
to recognize a duty without a corresponding right.379 The option is a conditional
contract only from the point of view of the optionor; from the point of view of the
optionee, it is only an offer, i.e. a power and not a right. This binocular
perspective is nonsense as a matter of legal description and is unnecessary. No
legal relation between two people can look one way from one perspective and
another way from the other perspective. If an option is a conditional contract
from the optionor's point of view, then it must also be one from the optionee's
point of view. Moreover, this usage has the effect of giving the option back to
the optionor. An obligor of a conditional obligation (the optionor's conditional
duty to convey) has the power to waive the non-occurrence of a non-material
condition to that obligation (i.e., the optionee's acceptance). But an optionor
obviously has no power to "waive" the optionee's acceptance and trigger the
underlying conveyance. A mere irrevocable offer from the optionee's point of
view must be a mere irrevocable offer from the optionor' S.38
The second problem with saying that an optionor is already bound to the
sales contract subject only to the condition of the optionee's acceptance of the
option, is that it is equally true to say that while an offer is pending any offeror is
bound to perform the offered contract subject only to the condition of the
offeree's acceptance. It is of course true that, unlike a mere offeror, the optionor
may neither revoke the offer nor repudiate the proposed sale until the end of the
option. But this does not mean that the optionor has entered into a sales contract
and must perform it upon the occurrence of all conditions precedent, any more
than this would be true of a non-option offeror. Indeed, following the
Restatement's reasoning, one could say that I am now bound by a contract to sell
you my car, subject only to the conditions that (1) I make you an offer to sell,

378. Id. § 37, cmt. b. The provision goes on to say, "The rules governing discharge of
contractual duties therefore apply." Id. See also CORBIN, supra note 1, § 11. 1, 463 (explaining that
the option relationship can be expressed either as a power and liability or as a binding contract in
which the optionor's duty of performance is subject to the condition of the optionee's acceptance).
379. See discussionsupra Part II.C.
380. The Restatement position also would require applying the entire law of conditions to
options, which is surely unintended. The Restatement takes the position that a "condition" arises
only after a contract is formed. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 224, cmt. c (AM.
LAW INST. 1981) ("In order for an event to be a condition, it must qualify a duty under an existing
contract. Events which are part of the process of formation of a contract, such as offer and
acceptance, are therefore excluded under the definition in this section."); FARNSWORTH, supra note
65, § 8.2, 522 -23 (explaining that the Restatement views conditions as occurring after a contract is
formed). Therefore, the Restatement is forced to make an exception for acceptances of offers that
constitute option contracts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 224, cmt. c. (AM. LAW
INST. 1981) (noting that under an option contract, acceptance is a condition). This is a clear

acknowledgment that the underlying contract has not yet been formed by mere issuance of the
option.
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and (2) you accept.
"Conditions" as prerequisites to the existence of a
contractual relationship are not the same as conditions to performance duties
within an existing contractual relationship, as Corbin well knew. 381 Insofar as
they are parties to a binding contract of sale, optionors are no more bound than
are ordinary contract offerors. In each case, they have a liability rather than a
conditional obligation.
The most serious consequence of construing irrevocable offers as binding
contracts has been the requirement that they be supported by consideration or a
382
consideration substitute such as reliance.
If options are not obligations, then
why should they require consideration? The compensation principle suggests an
obvious answer. Like releases, options can transfer value from one party to the
other. An option to buy shares of stock at a fixed price at any time within six
months gives the optionee the ability to profit from price increases in stock at the
optionor's expense. A requirement that the optionee furnish consideration
compensates the optionor for this wealth transfer. By contrast, for short term
options that do not involve a risk of price movement, Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code dispenses with the consideration requirement. 383
Viewing options under the proposed reconceptualization avoids the need to
mischaracterize them as obligations or "contracts" under the existing paradigm
and permits courts to accept the particular bundle of relationships that positive
law has imputed to them. It also permits the consideration requirement to be
rationalized by policy rather than by doctrine.

381. See CORBIN, supra note 1, § 30.5, 5 ("It would be possible to say that A already has a
right to have B pay A $100, conditional on their subsequently making a sale of goods on credit; but
we have not found such language to be practically convenient. If A offers goods to B for $100, on
thirty days credit, one more step has been taken; but we still do not say that A has a right to $100,
conditional on B's acceptance and the delivery of the goods. As soon as the offer is accepted and
there is mutual assent to the terms proposed, we use the term 'contract' and we begin to talk about
A's 'right' to payment.") (citations omitted).
382. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87(1)(a), cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
383. See U.C.C. § 2-205 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1997) ("An offer by a
merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed writing by which its terms gives assurance that it will be
held open is not revocable, for lack of consideration. . . ."). Consideration is required for long-term
option contracts longer than three months. Id. § 2-205, cmt. 3. See also United Nations Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods art. 16(2)(a), Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3
("[A]n offer cannot be revoked: (a) if it indicates, whether by stating a fixed time for acceptance or
otherwise, that it is irrevocable. . .. "); INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTION FOR THE UNIFICATION OF
PRIVATE LAW (UNIDROIT), PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (2010),
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2010/integralversionprinciples2010e.pdf.
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D. Arbitration Agreements: "If Arbitration Is Mandatory, It Must Be a
Duty"

Parties to a contract may agree that all disputes arising from their contract or
384
transaction are subject to mandatory arbitration.
If the agreement is valid and
enforceable, it disables the parties from maintaining a civil action or obtaining a
385
judgment on an arbitrable matter.
Arbitration agreements are enforceable
under the Federal Arbitration Act386 and under state arbitration acts.387

The

'

agreement subjects each party to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator, empowers each
party to pursue arbitration to an award, and may empower each party to confirm
such an award in court and enforce it by judicial process.388 At the same time, it
389
makes each party liable to these processes.
Parties typically include an arbitration agreement within the text of a written
contract, which this Article will refer to as the "container" contract. At times,
however, arbitration agreements may be formed as free-standing agreements or
as modification agreements entered into after a rights contract has been
formed.390
Although they are usually referred to as "contracts" by some courts,39
arbitration agreements are not contracts under the standard definition of contract.
While an arbitration agreement may create some incidental duties that may arise
in arbitration proceedings, their primary effect is to extinguish powers to litigate
claims in courts, while creating both powers to litigate them before an arbitrator
392
as well as liabilities to the resulting arbitral awards.
While some courts have
referred to a "duty to arbitrate," there is in reality no more duty to arbitrate than
there is a "duty to litigate" in the absence of an arbitration agreement.

384. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (requiring that written provisions in a
contract proposing settlement by arbitration are "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable"). See
generally Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
385. See Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 445-46 (explaining that valid arbitration agreements must go to
the arbitrator and not to the court).
386. See 9 U.S.C. § 2.
387. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-569.6 (2013) ("An agreement . . to submit to arbitration
any existing or subsequent controversy arising between the parties to the agreement is valid,
enforceable, and irrevocable . . . ."); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.01 (2015) ("A written agreement to
submit any existing controversy to arbitration or a provision in a written contract to submit to
arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between the parties is valid, enforceable and
irrevocable . . . .").
388. See 9 U.S.C. § 9 (allowing parties to pursue arbitration award and ability to confirm and
enforce it through the court).
389. See id. (explaining that any party may pursue these options, and thus any party is
reflectively liable).
390. See Vassilkovska v. Woodfield Nissan, Inc., 830 N.E.2d 619, 623 (Ill. Ct. App. 2005)
(noting that an arbitration agreement with specific survival language apart from the car purchase
was a separate document).
391. See id. at 624 (stating that the arbitration agreement was a contract in its own right).
392. Not all courts agree. See id. at 624-27, 629 (describing arbitration agreement as a
promise to arbitrate throughout opinion).
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Even when an arbitration agreement appears to be "part" of a container
agreement, that appearance is misleading. Under the United States Supreme
Court's decision in the Prima Paintz case, arbitration agreements are severable
from the container contracts in which they appear and do not depend on the
enforceability of the container contract for their effectiveness.393 Even if the
container contract is voidable for fraud394 or void for illegality,395 the arbitration
agreement it contains is fully effective unless the arbitration clause was itself
396
procured by fraud or is voidable for other reasons.
Nor is there any
requirement that an arbitration clause be supported by separate consideration if
the container agreement is unenforceable.397
Is consideration required for a free-standing arbitration clause? In the
typical case in which the agreement requires arbitration of any claim related to
the transaction brought by either party, the consent of each can be deemed to be
398
the consideration for the agreement of the other.

But the consideration issue has arisen in cases of "one-way" arbitration in
which only the claims of one of the parties are subject to mandatory arbitration
while the other party may bring its claims only in court. 399 Yet, even in the most

'one-sided' case, it is far from clear that consideration is necessary for a valid
arbitration agreement. Assume that A and B are parties to a contract. In a
separate agreement, they agree that all of A's claims arising from the transaction
will be subject to mandatory arbitration. Which party, if either, should give
consideration for this agreement? The disadvantage standard of consideration
suggested by the law of releases does not decide this issue. A has lost a remedial
power to bring a civil action and has gained a power to arbitrate its claims in a
different forum. B has gained and lost the reciprocal liabilities. If arbitration is

393. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403 (1967) ("[I]f the
claim is fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause itself-an issue which goes to the
'making' of the agreement to arbitrate the federal court may proceed to adjudicate it. But the
statutory language does not permit the federal court to consider claims of fraud in the inducement of
the contract generally.") (citation omitted).
394. See id.
395. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445-46 (2006) (stating that
issue of illegality is for the arbitrator).
396. Cf United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods art. 81
(1), Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 ("Avoidance does not affect any provision of the contract for
the settlement of disputes. . . .").
397. See Dan Ryan Builders, Inc. v. Nelson, 737 S.E.2d 550, 557 (W. Va. 2012) (finding that
a "majority of courts conclude that the parties need not have separate consideration for the
arbitration clause . . . so long as the underlying contract as a whole is supported by valuable
consideration.").
398. See, e.g., Owen v. MBPXL Corp., 173 F. Supp. 2d 905 (N.D. Iowa 2001) (holding that in
the case of a mutually binding arbitration clause in an employment contract, each party's agreement
to arbitrate is consideration given for the other party's agreeing to arbitrate).
399. See, e.g., Hull v. Norcom, Inc., 750 F.2d 1547, 1550 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that
sufficient consideration was required to support enforcement of arbitration provision in employment
contract which was unilaterally binding upon employee).
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indeed a more expeditious and less expensive route to a remedy, A may have
benefited more than B.
In Owen v. MBPXL Corp., the court noted in dicta that consideration is
necessary in an arbitration agreement executed by an employee after
employment had begun and apparently applicable only to claims made by the
employee and not to those made by the employer.400 The court's analysis was
formalist in the extreme, without any reference to the function that consideration
was thought to serve in such cases. 401 The court did not discuss which of the
parties should give and which should receive consideration in a contract calling
402
for one-way arbitration.
The court apparently assumed that the consideration
should move from the employer to the employee because the employer had
403
demanded the agreement.
But it is at least questionable which of the parties, if either, is burdened or
benefited by one-way arbitration agreements. That the claims of one party rather
than the other are to be determined in a forum that it thought to be more
expeditious and less costly does not clearly advantage either the claimant or the
defendant. In brief, there is no principled way to determine which of the two
parties to a "one-way" arbitration contract should supply consideration to the
other.
In general, however, the creation of remedial powers in dispute resolution
404
clauses appears not to require consideration, but only an agreement.
The
reason appears to be that choice of law, forum selection, and arbitration
agreements do not invoke the compensation principle because they are not seen
to impose a disproportionate burden on one of the parties or to shift wealth from
one party to the other.
V.

RECONCEPTUALIZING CONTRACT

A.

A Comprehensive Concept of Contract

The brief survey of agreements in Part IV shows that there is much more to
contractual private ordering than the creation of new rights and duties. A truly
comprehensive concept of private ordering includes all deliberately created,
personal legal relationships.
This would work no radical change.
The

400. Owen, 173 F. Supp. at 913-15 (citations omitted) (holding that arbitration agreements in
Iowa are governed by laws of contract).
401. See id. 915-16 (quoting Southtrust Bank v. Williams, 775 So. 2d 184, 188 (Ala. 2000)).
402. Id.
403. Id. at 914, 916 n.5 (citations omitted) (The court found consideration in the employer's
continued employment of the employee. It might have inferred the employee's consent to the
agreement on the same facts. However, the court recognized many courts require a mutual promise
to arbitrate as necessary consideration to support an arbitration agreement in an employment
contract.).
404. See Hull, 750 F.2d at 1550 (holding that an exchange of promises to arbitrate is sufficient
consideration).
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conventional conception of contract already includes assent or agreement;
exercise of a formative power; creation of personal legal relations; and
"bindingness." 405 These same elements characterize the creations of irrevocable
privileges, powers, and immunities, which are, for that reason, quintessentially
contractual.
These points strongly suggest the utility of redefining "contractual relation"
and "contract." A comprehensive definition of contract in the Restatement of
Contracts would be the following:
A "contractual relation" is any binding, personal right, privilege, power,
or immunity formed by agreement of the parties to the relationship. A
"contract" is a group of such contractual relations that are formed
406
together.
A consistent definition in the Uniform Commercial Code would be the
following:
Contract means the entire legal relationship that results from the parties'
agreement as determined by the Uniform Commercial Code as
supplemented by any other applicable laws.
"Personal" relations exclude the interests that are created by acquisition or
transfer of property407 but include personal variations in property rights, such as
licenses. The theoretical underpinnings and background rules of property
relations differ significantly from those relating to the creation of personal
408
relations.

.

405. See U.C.C. § 1-201(AM. LAW. INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1977) ("'Contract' . .
means the total legal obligation that results from the parties' agreement as determined by [the
U.C.C.]. .. ."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) ("A contract
is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance
of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.").
406. This definition is consistent with the relational contract theory propounded by Professor
Macneil: "Contract [refers to] the relations among parties to the process of projecting exchange into
the future." MACNEIL, supra note 11, at 4.
407. CORBIN, supra note 1, § 1.3, 10-11 ("Commonly accepted definitions of contract often
exclude those transactions that may be properly described as barters.... In the case of a fully
effective exchange of lands or chattels, there may be no promise made that is ever enforceable at
law or that is capable of breach, and there may be no problems of interpretation or of mistake of the
like. Such a fully effective exchange, without including any enforceable promise by either party,
creates numerous legal relations. These, however, are customarily described as property relations
and not as contractual relations.").
408. Professor Corbin would have gone farther than this. He included property transfers such
as barters and gifts within the domain of contracts. Id. ("Such a transaction creates new physical
relations, and in an organized society it creates new legal relations. These new relations arise by the
voluntary action and consent of the two parties; but there is created no special right in one party by
which to compel a subsequent performance by the other. Nonetheless, the law of contract will
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The comprehensive conception of contract also excludes background or
default legal relations that are not deliberately formed by the parties. 409 The
power to make a contract is not itself contractual, but is a background power
created by law.410 Contract is limited to legal relations that are created by
agreement or manifestations of assent,411 and not, for example, by breach of a
duty or by operation of law.412
Finally, the proposed redefinition excludes non-binding or revocable
privileges, powers, and immunities that may be created during the course of
commercial interactions. Contract offers, counter-offers, and revocations all
create new legal relations but are not binding on the parties who make them in
any significant sense of the word "binding."
With one exception discussed below, the comprehensive conception of
contracts would continue to include all of the legal relationships currently
recognized as contracts by the Restatement, the U.C.C., and the treatise writers.
Because the creation of new rights by agreement fits the proposed definition, for
clarity, legal relations centering on obligations could be differentiated as "rights
contracts." Those centering on other relations could be known as "privilege
contracts," "power contracts," or "immunity contracts." Contractual relations
would then include all the rights, privileges, powers, and immunities that are
formed in the contract bundle. More importantly, however, contracts for the first
time would also include all such relations created outside the scope of a
traditional "rights contract" in discrete transactions.

supply much of the analysis and many of the rules if a dispute arises between the parties.... In a
practical working sense, the transaction may be called a contract").
409. See id. at 11 (differentiating between property relations and contractual relations when
parties have relations not only between themselves, but between themselves and all others subject to
a law).
410. See id. at 9-10 (synthesizing the U.C.C. definition of a contract as "the total legal
obligation which results from the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language or by
implication from other circumstances, as affected by rules of law"). See also, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 36-1-201(12) (2012) (defining a contract under South Carolina law); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-1201(b)(12) (2013) (defining a contract under North Carolina law).
411. See CORBIN, supra note 1,§ 1.3, at 10-11,§ 1.9, at 25.
412. The concept therefore excludes from the scope of contracts the legal relations created by
the following actions:
(1) The breach of a statutory or common law duty or an action that gives rise to a claim
for restitution.
(2) Actions and relations involved in the judicial enforcement of a remedial claim, such
as filing a complaint or levying execution on a judgment.
(3) Actions that incidentally subject parties to a duty that is created by law, such as
driving on a highway or making a material representation of fact.
(4) The exercise of a remedial right or power, such as the power to avoid a contract on
grounds of fraud, mistake, or duress.
See id. § 1.3, at 11 (illustrating by example that the legal relationship between two parties, if it is
shared among all parties by law, is a legal relationship and not a special relationship created by a
manifestation of assent, and therefore is not contract).
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One particular type of right that is defined as a contract under the current
usage may be a contract under the new concept, which limits contract to relations
deliberately created through agreement. The new description applies fully to
contacts created by mutual assent expressed in an offer and acceptance. But
some courts and scholars analyze liability for promises that are made enforceable
under the principle of promissory estoppel as a form of tort liability arising not
from the deliberate exercise of a power, but that arises from breach of a duty
imposed by law.4 3 Under this perspective, the promisor has breached a general
legal duty not to make and then break a reliance-inducing promise, a duty
resembling the duty not to make an intentional, reliance-inducing
misrepresentation of material fact.
Tort liability under Section 90 does not result from the deliberate exercise of
a power by either the promisor or the promisee but arises by operation of law.414
The promisor does not exercise a power by making the promise, in the way that
415
an offeror does by making an offer.
And unlike an offeree who expresses
acceptance in order to create a binding contract, the promisee of such a promise
does not exercise a power by deliberately relying on the promise so as to make it
416
enforceable.
She is rather in the position of the victimized recipient of a
fraudulent misrepresentation. The remedy is typically compensatory, limited to
the amount necessary to compensate reliance instead of the expectation interest
appropriate to a rights contract.4 17
By contrast, a contracts perspective on promissory estoppel sees the
promisor as exercising a power to assume a duty to perform her promise by
expressing an intention to be legally bound. 4 18 Her promise seeks the promisee's

413. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 87-90 (1974); Warren A. Seavey,
Reliance Upon Gratuitous Pormises or Other Conduct, 64 HARV. L. REv. 913, 925-28 (1951)
(arguing promissory estoppel is "basically a tort doctrine"). Drawing a similar distinction for views
of promissory estoppel and section 90 was Jay M. Feinman, The Last Promissory Estoppel, 61
FORDHAM L. REV. 303, 306-07 (1992). This Article was incidentally designed and destined to be
the most inaccurately-titled law review article ever.
414. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 90

(Am. LAW INST. 1979) ("A promise

which the promise should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the
promise or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice
can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.").
415. The promisee of a potential Section 90 promise does not have a power equivalent to that
of an offeree of a bargain promise. She cannot deliberately choose to make the promise enforceable
by her act of reliance in the way that an offeree can make the offer enforceable by her act of
acceptance. See DeLong, supra note 236, at 950-58.
416. See id.
417. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 90

(AM. LAW INST. 1979) ("The remedy may

be limited as justice may require."). Nevertheless, even if promissory estoppel is seen as a tort,
expectation damages are occasionally justified, just as they are for the tort of fraud. See L.L. Fuller
& William R. Purdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in ContractDamages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 73-75
(1936).
418. See DeLong, supra note 236, at 950-58, 968-70, 992-94 (analyzing promise and consent
theories of promissory estoppel). Early exponents of the contract perspective include: Randy E.
Barnett & Mary E. Becker, Beyond Reliance: Promissory Estoppel, Contract Formalities, and
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'

reliance in a way that a contract promisor seeks consideration. 4 19 Her obligation
to perform the duty is conditional on the promisee's actual, foreseeable
-420
reliance.
Although the promisee does not deliberately exercise a power by relying in
the way that a bargain contract offeree does, he may rely with the awareness that
he will be legally protected, as does the offeree. Because reliance creates a
contract, the remedy for breach of the promise is measured by expectation rather
than reliance. Like bargain contracts, these promises are enforced in order to
encourage promisors to make and perform them and promisees to rely on
them.4 2
Whether promissory estoppel creates a contract under the proposed
definition therefore depends on whether the principle of promissory estoppel is
seen as recognizing a tort duty or a contract power, a matter for which there is no
422
clear consensus.
But no change in the substantive law of promissory estoppel
would flow from either conception of contract.
B. Rationalizingthe Enforcement ofPrivileges, Powers, and Immunities
Judicial recognition of rights contracts has demanded theoretical analysis
and normative justification; judicial recognition of privileges, powers, and

Misrepresentation, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 443, 445-46 (1987) ("[P]romissory estoppel serves . . the
enforcement of some promises intended as legally binding and the imposition of liability to
compensate for harm caused by [promissory] misrepresentations."); Juliet P. Krostitsky, A New
Theory of Assent-Based Liability Emerging Under the Guise of Promissory Estoppel: An
Explanation and Defense, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 895 (1987) (discussing that promissory estoppel is
used when barriers to formalized contracting exist); Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond
Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the "Invisible Handshake," 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903
(1985); Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101 YALE L.J. 111
(1991). Although the claim of the last two articles that courts are resolving claims on the basis of
promise in the absence of reliance has been roundly refuted, see DeLong, supra note 236, at 986
n. 138 (internal citations omitted), their perspective that the role of promissory estoppel ought to be
the enforcement of promises is still widely shared
419. See DeLong, supra note 236, at 951-52 ("[A]ctors make a . . promise for only two
reasons: to "sell" the promise in a bargained-for exchange or to induce the promisee to rely in some
way on the promisor's
commitment
to
perform a non-bargained
promise ....
Rational . . .promisors will make non-bargain promises only when their expected benefit from the
promisee's . . reliance exceeds the expected cost of making the promise, including the expected
cost of performance and any potential liability for breach.").
420. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (AM. LAW INST. 1979) ("A
promise . . . which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided
only by enforcement of the promise.") (emphasis added).
421. The implication of the contract view is that both parties will make decisions, whether to
promise and perform or to rely, with reference to the potential enforceability of the promise under
Section 90. By contrast, a tort view of promissory estoppel would disqualify a promisee's reliance
on a non-bargain promise if it were done deliberately to make the promise enforceable.
422. My view, expressed in DeLong, supra note 236, at 946, is that liability under Section 90
is contractual only in those rare circumstances in which the promisor expresses an intention to be
legally bound and the promisee reasonably relies on the promise being legally binding.
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immunities requires no less. Such analyses currently address the question "Why
does the law enforce some promises and not others?" They must also answer
such questions as "Why is a rights-holder bound by a release?", "Why should a
gratuitous license or option be revocable?", and "What justifies giving legal
effect to choice of law agreement?"
The judicial borrowing of rights-contract rules and principles for application
to non-rights contracts discussed in the previous section suggests that a similar
borrowing might be justified at the theoretical level. Competing justificatory
theories of contract law rationalize legal enforcement of contractual rights by
reference to different institutional and moral values. 3 The arguments raised by
these theories can apply with similar force to legal recognition of contractual
privileges, powers, and immunities because these are often theories of agreement
rather than theories of rights or obligations.
Efficiency theories of contract,424 for example, justify enforcement of
contractual duties on grounds that enforcement facilitates voluntary, nonsimultaneous exchange by reducing transaction costs.

425

Under stipulated

market conditions, voluntary exchange by rational parties results in an efficient
reallocation of goods, the effect of which is to increase wealth or utility for both
426
parties.
The contractual capacity to create legally binding performance
427
This
obligations reduces the transaction cost of non-simultaneous exchange.
is said to justify judicial enforcement of contracts by their contribution to social
welfare.42 8
But the creation of a new, legally-enforceable obligation is not the only way
that contract law might facilitate value-creating exchanges in legal transactions.
Privileges, powers, and immunities can also create efficiency. For example, in
The Problem of Social Cost,429 Ronald Coase argued that, in the absence of
transaction costs, parties would renegotiate their property entitlements to an

423. See generally SMITH, supra note 316, at 101-23 (discussing the differences of the
foundations of legal systems and the subsequent effects); RANDY BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES
AND DOCTRINE 585-604 (4th ed. 2008).
424. See Robert Cooter & Melvin A. Eisenberg, Damagesfor Breach of Contract, 73 CALIF.
L. REV. 1432, 1460 (1985) ("[A] contract is efficient if its terms maximize the value that can be
created by the contemplated exchange.").
425. POSNER, supra note 265, § 4.1, at 99 ("[P]lacing the risk of [breach] on [a party] by
making it liable for damages to the [other party] . . ., may be the cheapest way of minimizing the
costs of such delays in the future."); STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 297-98 (2004) (discussing why enforcement of contracts is desired for economic benefits to
all parties).
426. This is the familiar Pareto efficiency standard under which no party is left in a worse
position by an exchange and at least one is left in a better position; thus, net utility increases. See
POSNER, supra note 265, § 1.2, at 12-13.
427. Id. § 4.1, at 98-99; SHAVELL, supra note 425, at 297-99.
428. Id.
429. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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allocatively efficient arrangement regardless of their initial distribution. 430 He
gave the example of neighboring farmers and cattle ranchers disputing over the
effects of trespassing cattle who destroyed part of the farmers' crops. 43 ' Based
on assumptions about the marginal effects of increases in herd size on the
marginal values of crops the extra cows would destroy, he demonstrated that, in
the absence of transaction costs,432 the parties would negotiate their way to an

efficient level of grazing and growing regardless of whether the farmer had an
initial legal entitlement to damages for the value of crops destroyed by the cattle
or, conversely, the cattle rancher initially had no liability for such damage. If the
marginal profit to be made by the rancher exceeded loss in value to the farmer,
the rancher would either pay damages or purchase a license from the farmer.
It is significant that this canonical "Coasean bargain" might result in the
creation of a new privilege (a license to graze cattle) rather than a new duty (to
compensate for crop losses caused by grazing).433 An efficient rearrangement of
legal entitlements will require both creation and destruction of rights, powers,
privileges, and immunities.
Under the economic assumptions that support contemporary contract
analysis, the deliberate creation of any of the four personal legal relationships
can increase allocative efficiency.4 34 Any informed mutual agreement to enter
into a new, personal legal relationship implies that the new legal relationship
increases both parties' utility simply because each of them prefers the new
relationship to the old one. Efficiency justifies giving prima facie judicial
recognition to any voluntary and informed choice made by both parties to alter
their legal relationship.4 35
Skillful use of privileges, powers, and immunities by commercial parties
sometimes reduces transaction costs of economic exchange in ways that cannot

430. Id. at 6. See also RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 14 (1988)
(citing Coase, supra note 429, at 8) ("[T]he ultimate result (which maximizes the value of
production) is independent of the legal system if the pricing system is assumed to work without
cost.").
431. Coase, supranote 429, at 2-8.
432. Id. at 6. This assumption was not naively made, of course. The point of the Coase
theorem is that, in the presence of transaction costs, it will very much matter how initial
entitlements are allocated; reallocation may be unfeasible.
433. Id.
434. Id. The grazing license does not place either party under a primary duty to act or refrain
from acting. Rather, the farmer has no-right that the cattle rancher refrain from letting his cattle go
onto the servient estate. If the efficient solution were instead to restrict the cattle, however, the
creation of a duty would be necessary to oblige the rancher to restrain the cattle or pay damages for
their harm to the farmer's crop.
435. On the relationship between welfare and utility theories that may underlie the
consideration requirement, see TREBILCOCK, supra note 259, at 164-87. The author, following the
lead of Milton Friedman and others, limits his analysis to exchange transactions, referred to as
"economic" transactions. This analysis should apply with equal force to any voluntary, agreedupon change in legal relations.
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436

be achieved by the use of rights and duties.
Privilege contracts (contracts that
extinguish duties) can reduce transaction costs by reducing juridical risks that a
contractor might face. Examples are warranty disclaimers, damage limitations,
and other limitations on performance duties. Power contracts can reduce
transaction costs by permitting parties to a rights contract to modify performance
obligations, reallocating the risks associated with uncertainty regarding future
events. Examples are options, contractual conditions, termination fees, and
forfeiture clauses.
Immunity contracts reduce the transaction costs of
negotiation and contract administration. Examples are non-reliance agreements
and no oral modification clauses.
Both economic and non-economic theory have been used to justify
enforcement of promises on the basis of the promisee's reliance. Reliance
theories of contract justify enforcement of reliance-inducing promises in order to
protect and encourage such reliance.437 Such theories can equally well justify
judicial recognition of privileges, powers, and immunities on which parties have
acted in reliance. 438 The equitable considerations that create rights contracts
based on reliance-based estoppel apply equally to agreements creating privileges,
powers, and immunities. Parties create contractual duties so that they can plan
and rely on performance; they create privileges, powers, and immunities so that
they can plan and rely on the safety and flexibility they afford.
The consent theory of contract justifies legal enforcement of contract
promises on grounds that the obligor has expressed consent to be legally
bound. 439 For the same reasons, consent could similarly justify holding a party
to the legal consequences of its deliberate manifestation of agreement to create a
privilege, power or immunity in another party. Such consent is expressed more
directly by a declarative statement than by a promise.
A promise theory of contract holds that the law should enforce promises
because the promisor has intentionally made use of a social convention whose
function it is to obligate the promisor and to give moral grounds to another to

436. See Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics ofPromissory Estoppel in
PreliminaryNegotiations, 105 YALE L.J. 1249, 1253-59 (1996) (discussing economic theory as it
applies to promissory estoppel in the context of preliminary negotiations).
437. SMITH, supra note 316, § 3.2; Fuller & Perdue, supra note 418, at 73. Modern contract
theorists have sought legal regimes that induce the optimal level of reliance on contractual and noncontractual undertakings. Katz, supra note 437, at 1253-59; Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Omri BenShahar, PrecontractualReliance, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 423 (2001); Melvin A. Eisenberg & Brett H.
McDonnell, Expectation Damagesand the Theory of Overreliance, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1335 (2003).
438. The Restatement of Contracts does give effect to some non-rights contracts on the basis
of one of the party's reasonable reliance. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87(2)
(AM. LAW INST. 1982) (explaining that offers which can reasonably be expected to induce preacceptance action of a substantial nature on the part of the offeree are binding as an option contract);
id. § 89(c) (noting that a promise which modifies a duty under a yet un-performed contract is
binding if the other party changes position in reliance on that promise).
439. Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 300 (1986)
("[L]egal enforcement is morally justified because the promisor voluntarily performed acts that
conveyed her intention to create a legally enforceable obligation by transferring alienable rights.").
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expect the promised performance.4 40 On similar grounds, parties who create
legal relationships by non-promissory, declarative speech acts such as waiver or
release might equally be said to have taken advantage of conventional forms,
such as forgiveness, and should be held equally bound or committed to the social
meaning and legal effects of their speech acts.
All this is not to say that existing theory is adequate to justify the rules
relating to privileges, powers, and immunities tout court. For example, both
economic and moral theories are often used to justify immutable rules,
immunizing certain legal relationships from the effects of contractual private
ordering.44' Such relationships should be equally immune from abrogation
through contracts that create privileges, powers, and immunities. But it is
doubtful that radically new principles must be created to rationalize these forms
of private ordering because agreement is the object of existing theory.
VI. CONCLUSION

So, "Who cares?" The power of private parties to bind themselves to
enforceable legal duties has long been thought to be the signal achievement of
Anglo-American law. Explicit recognition of a corresponding power of private
parties to bind themselves to personal privileges, powers, and immunities will
complete the picture of private ordering that has developed in the interstices of
contract law, and will be deserving of equal praise.
442
Hohfeld's descriptive system is non-normative in its implications.
Like
mathematics to an economist or physicist, it provides a precise language with
which the court can define a problem and then articulate its holding and its
reasons. Judicial decisions involving privileges, powers, and immunities will
continue to be the product of precedent, authority, principles, policies, and
whatever else contributes to the resolution of hard cases. A comprehensive
conception of contract will only make the court more aware and the ruling more
precise.
But judicial awareness of the non-rights relations may nevertheless have
substantive effects. For example, a comprehensive conception of contract should
lead to a more discriminating application of the consideration doctrine, one that
is based on more than whether the claim is based on "contract." In particular, a
comprehensive theory may help to create a presumption in favor of the

440. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACT OBLIGATION 16
(1981).
The moral justification for contract enforcement figured prominently in the recent
discussion of the morality of contract law by Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract
and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708 (2007).
441. Ayers, supra note 1, at 90 1-02.
442. See generally HOHFELD,supra note 226, at 23-64 (discussing Hohfeld's interpretation of
how the variance of personal relations formed by contracts ought to have an effect on judicial
holdings).
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enforceability of voluntary, informed agreements that create privileges, powers,
and immunities in the absence of rights and duties.
Finally, for aesthetic purposes, a comprehensive theory of contract shifts the
observer's gaze from legal enforceability to cooperative activity. The transaction
lawyer knows well how rights, privileges, powers, and immunities can be
assembled into an elegant, coordinated system of legal relations that can
facilitate a commercial transaction. Rights and duties may be appropriate when
brute force is needed, but carefully-designed privileges, powers, and immunities
are more likely to harmonize the parties' interests.
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